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Abstract
This paper studies a committee decision-making problem. Committee members
are heterogeneous in their competence, they are biased towards one of the alter-
natives and career oriented, and they can choose whether to vote or abstain. The
interaction between career concern and bias a¤ects the voting behavior of mem-
bers depending on transparency of individual votes. We show that transparency
attenuates the pre-existing biases of competent members and exacerbates the
biases of incompetent members. Public voting leads to better decisions when the
magnitude of the bias is large, while secret voting performs better otherwise. We
provide experimental evidence supporting our theoretical conclusions.
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1 Introduction
Committee decision-making is a central feature of many political and economic or-
ganizations, including governments, legislative bodies, central banks, law courts, and
private companies. A widespread view in the literature is that group decision-making
provides an e¢ cient way to aggregate disperse information and contributes mitigating
the interference of individual biases in the decision.1
The issues confronted by committees are often complex and involve a variety of
conicting interests. Indeed, there are a number of situations in which the goals of
committee members are not aligned with the objectives of the community or the orga-
nization as a whole. Consider, for example, the case of a company deciding whether
to downsize a particular division, legislators voting on a constitutional reform that
may be harmful to some of them, or members of a monetary committee with di¤erent
concerns about ination versus unemployment.2 Furthermore, committee members are
usually motivated by the desire to advance their own careers and, therefore, care about
being perceived as competent decision makers. For example, the reputation for making
correct decisions is crucial for the reappointment of the members of a companys board
of directors, or for top bureaucrats.3
Only recently, and partly following a trend towards increased procedural trans-
parency in central banking, the literature has started focusing on the e¤ects of trans-
parency of voting procedures on decision making in committees.4 To the best of our
knowledge, however, none of the existing papers has investigated how career concerns,
individual biases and common interest interact in shaping individualsvoting behavior
in a committee, and how this interaction is a¤ected by transparency.
Our main question is whether the individual votes of members should be made
public or not, i.e. whether voting should be transparent or secret. We consider a simple
yet versatile theoretical environment where agents are heterogenous in two private
dimensions, competence and preferences. Decisions over a binary agenda is taken by
simple majority and committee members can vote for either alternative or abstain.
1See Gerling et al [14] and Li and Suen [22] for reviews of this literature.
2Blinder [4] argues that members of monetary committees are potentially heterogeneous along
several dimensions: they may have di¤erent political preferences, they may believe in di¤erent models
of the economy or use di¤erent forecasts, they may use di¤erent heuristics in the decision-making
process.
3See Wilson [35].
4See Gersbach and Hahn [11] and [12], Hansen et al [17], Levy [21], Meade and Stasavage [24],
Stasavage [32] and Swank and Visser [33].
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Individualspayo¤ depends on three components: i) Whether the committee adopts
the correct decision; ii) the committee members bias for either alternative; iii) their
perceived competence.
Our analysis highlights that the existence of career concerns leads to qualitatively
di¤erent conclusions depending on the agents competence level and the magnitude of
her bias relative to the common value. We show that, when committee members are
relatively biased, career concerns act to correctthe vote of competent members who
otherwise would have simply voted according to their personal interests. On the other
hand, when committee members are relatively unbiased, these same concerns induce
the incompetent members to vote for their biases, even though they would otherwise
have preferred to abstain. While the former e¤ect is fairly straightforward, the latter
is somewhat more subtle. Intuitively, when the common value is su¢ ciently large,
it is optimal for the incompetent members to abstain, since by doing so they dele-
gate the decision to the competent agents. This is the well-known swing-voter curse,
rst studied by Feddersen and Pesendorfer [9]. In our model, however, such behavior
a¤ects perceived competence negatively, since in equilibrium abstention signals incom-
petence.This creates an incentive for the incompetent members to vote and, when they
do so, they choose the alternative towards which they are biased. In this sense, our
model uncovers that career concerns may actually exacerbate the pre-existing biases
of incompetent members.
We show that public voting should be preferred when the magnitude of the bias
is large relative to the common value, in which case transparency helps mitigating
the inuence of private interests on the decisions. Conversely, secret voting should
be adopted when the intensity of the bias is relatively small, in which case the non-
observability of individual votes reduces the incentives for incompetent members to
gambleand vote just in order to avoid revealing their lack of competence.
The present analysis yields some interesting implications for the design of com-
mittee decision-making rules. Our model emphasizes the idea that voting should be
transparent in committees where members are highly subjected to the inuence of ide-
ological or self-interested motives. This is often the case of committees composed by
politicians such as congressional committees. Other examples are boards of directors
of large organizations, where there is usually a diversity of specic interests involved
in each decision, or hiring committees in academic departments, where members are
sometimes biased towards candidates in their own eld. Conversely, voting should
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be kept secret when the dissent among members due to individual biases is relatively
small, as it is perhaps the case of committees of experts charged with highly technical
decisions such as top bureaucrats.5
Some recent empirical ndings by Mian et al [25] suggest an additional possible
implication of our results. The authors provide compelling evidence that politicians and
voters become more politically polarized in the aftermath of nancial crises. In light of
these ndings, our results suggest that voting in committees should be transparent in
relatively bad timeswhen ideological biases may tend to be exacerbated. Conversely,
secret vote might perform well in relatively good timeswhen ideological positions
are less polarized.
We test the main theoretical predictions of the model by means of a controlled
laboratory experiment. As it will be clear later in the paper, there are regions of the
parameters space where our model features multiple equilibria with di¤erent properties.
From this perspective, a controlled experiment can inform about whether individuals
coordinate on certain equilibria and not on others. Perhaps more importantly, a con-
trolled laboratory experiment allows us to collect data on individualsbehavior under
the di¤erent treatments of interest, i.e. secret versus public voting.6
Our experimental setting is simple and naturally originates from the theoretical
model. We consider a 2 by 2 design: low versus high bias and secret versus public vot-
ing. Consistently with our theoretical predictions, secret vote performs better (worse)
than public voting in aggregating information with relatively low (high) bias. While
half of the incompetent subjects abstains under secret vote and low bias, this propor-
tion drops dramatically with public vote and it is almost zero in the case of high bias.
Furthermore, our results in the secrete low-bias treatment are in line with the results of
the literature on swing voters curse.7 When there are multiple equilibria, our results
suggests that subjects eventually coordinate on the e¢ cient equilibrium.
5Alesina and Tabellini [1] and [2] study theoretically the optimal assignment of policy tasks to
elected politicians or to non-elected bureaucrats. For an empirical analysis see Iaryczower et al [19].
6For an alternative approach, which exploits a natural experiment related to the release of the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) transcripts, see Hansen et al [17], Meade and Stasavage
[24] and Swank et al [34].
7See Battaglini et al [3] and Morton and Tyran [28] and [29]. See also Herrera et al [18] for theory
and experiments on strategic abstention in proportional elections.
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2 Literature Review
A number of papers in the literature have shown that transparency in decision-making
is not always advisable since it creates incentives for agents to distort their behavior
in order to convey information about their types. This has been investigated for sin-
gle decision makers and in the context of decision-making in committees.8 Gersbach
and Hahn [12] and Levy [21] examine models where agents care about acquiring a
reputation for competence. They show that secret voting leads to better decisions by
reducing distortions arising from signalling. Specically, Levy [21] shows that trans-
parency induces agents to vote too much against the prior (i.e. the ex-ante more likely
alternative) in order to signal that they have accurate information about the state of
the world. Gersbach and Hahn [11] and Stasavage [32], on the other hand, analyze
a setting where committee members may be misaligned with the interests of society,
but also care about being perceived as unbiased to the extent that this enhances
their reelection prospects. They show that transparency is optimal in this case, since
it induces agents to act in accordance with the public interest. In addition to these
papers, Gersbach and Hahn [13] show that transparency induces agents to exert more
e¤ort in order to improve their chances of reappointment, Dal Bo [6] and Felgenhauer
and Gruner [8] argue that public voting makes the committee more vulnerable to the
inuence of special interest groups, and Swank and Visser [33] point out that career
concerns create an incentive for committees to conceal internal disagreements and show
a united front in public. Di¤erently from this literature, we study how bias and career
concern interact with each other allowing for the possibility of abstention and without
imposing that individual biases per se are punished.
As for the experimental literature on committee decision making, the most related
paper to ours is Fehrler and Hughes [10]. As in our paper, they focus on the e¤ect
of transparency on committee decision making where agents are career concerned.
Di¤erently from our approach, their committee members are unbiased, committees are
composed of two individuals, and the experimental focus is mostly on deliberation.9
8For single decision makers see Maskin and Tirole [23], Morris [26] and Prat [31].
9See also Morton and Ou [27] for an empirical investigation of whether secret voting leads to less
prosocial voting behavior than public voting.
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3 The Model
We consider a committee of n  3 members, with n odd, that must decide between
two alternatives, A and B. There are two states of the world, ! 2 fA;Bg, with
Pr (! = A) = q 2 (0; 1):While the true state is a priori unknown, committee members
may receive an informative signal about it si 2 fA; ;; Bg. An agent may be either
competent, c, in which case he receives a perfectly informative signal, or incompetent,
nc, in which case he receives an uninformative signal. We assume that each member
knows his own competence type  i 2 fc,ncg and the distribution of other members
competences, which is given by Pr ( i = c) =  2 (0; 1). After observing their private
signals, all members decide simultaneously whether to vote for A or B or to abstain,
vi 2 fA; ;; Bg. The nal decision, x 2 fA;Bg, is determined by simple majority rule
and ties are broken randomly.
The committee members care about making correct decisions and receive a common
value  > 0 whenever the nal choice is equal to the state of the world, i.e. x = !.
Additionally, we suppose that every member is biased towards one of the alternatives,
i.e. each agent is biased towards either A or B. Every committee member knows
his own bias type, i 2 fA;Bg, as well as the distribution of other agentsbiases,
Pr (i = A) = p 2 (0; 1), which we assume to be common knowledge. An agent biased
towards i, receives an extra payo¤  > 0, irrespective of the state of the world, when
alternative x = i is chosen by the committee.
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The members of the committee are also concerned with building a reputation for
competence and making correct decisions. Following the literature, we assume the
existence of an additional agent, the external evaluator, whose task is simply to update
his beliefs about the likelihood that each member is competent and voted correctly,
conditional on the state of the world plus any other relevant information that might
be available to him. We suppose that the state of the world is always revealed ex-post.
Furthermore, under public voting, the evaluator is able to observe the individual votes
of all members, while under secret voting, he is able to observe only the aggregate
number of votes for each alternative.11 The posterior probability that an agent i is
10This model extends the setting studied by Nakaguma [30] to an asymmetric environment.
11Alternatively, we could have assumed that only the nal decision of the committee was observed
under secrecy. See the discussion in the online Appendix A about changes in voting rule and degree
of transparency.
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competent and voted correctly is, therefore, given by:
r!;i  Pr( i = c;vi = !j!; I); (1)
where ! is the state of the world,  2 fp; sg denotes whether voting is public or
secret, and I represents all relevant information available under . The condition
that a committee member competence is valued only if his vote is correct (with some
likelihood) can be interpreted as capturing a situation where the external evaluator
cares not only about the competence of the agent per se, but also whether the agent is
using his expertise to advance the common interest of the group. This assumption not
only simplies the analysis but proves particularly useful in the experimental study of
our theory.12
Thus, given the state of the world !, and the committees decision x, the utility of
a member i biased towards i under voting rule  is given by:
u
i;
i (x; !) = r
!;
i + Ifx=!g+ Ifx=ig; (2)
where  is the weight assigned to career concerns and Ifg is an indicator function equal
to one if the condition inside brackets is satised and zero otherwise.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
We solve the model for symmetric pure-strategy equilibria, where committee members
of the same type (i.e., with the same bias and competence level) choose identical
strategies. We also assume that agents do not use weakly-dominated strategies. In
equilibrium, each committee member chooses a voting strategy that maximizes his
expected utility, given the equilibrium strategies of other players and the external
evaluators beliefs. At the same time, the evaluators beliefs must be consistent with
12Under this denition, a committee member receives zero reputation whenever he abstains or
votes incorrectly under public voting. Intuitively, this assumes an external evaluator very tough on
whoever says I am not sure what to door who expresses blatantly wrong opinions. While it is not
always the case that not taking a position is detrimental for expected competence, our assumption
seems plausible in a variety of cases. For example, an expert who candidly reveals in public that he
does not know what is the right policy to implement would most probably harm his reputation for
competency. We show in Section 5 that the main qualitative results of our analysis are robust to using
an alternative denition that is based only on the posterior probability that the agent is competent,
r!;i  Pr( i = cj!; I).
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the agentsstrategies and computed by Bayesrule.
4.1 Basic Properties
We begin our analysis by providing a general characterization of the basic properties of
the equilibria. Let i denote the conjecture held by a committee member i about the
behavior of other members and the beliefs of the external evaluator. Suppose rst that
member i observes the state of the world prior to voting, i.e. he receives a perfectly
informative signal. Given the conjecture i and the state of the world !, player is
strategy, vi 2 fA; ;; Bg, induces a probability distribution over nal outcomes, which
is represented by the mapping !i : fA; ;; Bg ! [0; 1], where !i (vi) denotes the
probability, as perceived by the agent, that the committees decision is A when the
agent chooses vi, given i and !: Observe that the probability 
!
i
(vi) already takes
into account all the uncertainty related to the realization of types of other committee
members. Furthermore, it must be the case that:
!i (B)  !i (;)  !i (A) ; (3)
since a vote for A can never lead to a lower probability that the committees decision is
A (relative to the case where the individual abstains) and, similarly, a vote for B can
never increase the probability that the nal outcome is A (relative to the case where
he abstains).13
Next, let e be the external evaluators beliefs about the behavior of committee
members. Under public voting, all individual votes are observable ex-post, so that ca-
reer concern reward depend only on each members own vote according to the following
expression:
r!;pi;e = Pre(t = cjv = !)Ifvi=!g; (4)
where Pre(t = cjv = !), is computed based on the external evaluatorsbeliefs about
the behavior of voters and Ifvi=!g is an indicator function that equals one when agent
i votes correctly, vi = !. Under secret voting, on the other hand, only the aggregate
vote is observable ex-post, so that career concern rewards can be made contingent
only on the total number of correct votes, V c Pi Ifvi=!g, according to the following
13The inequalities are weak since there may be situations where the committee member is not
expected to be pivotal.
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expression:
r!;se = Pre(t = cjv = !)V
c
n
; (5)
where V c=n represents the probability that a particular agent voted correctly. Observe
that the evaluator expects that each member is equally likely to have cast one of the
V c correct votes, given that all agents are ex-ante identical. Therefore, in this case,
the career concern rewards are the same across all members and equal to the average
expected competence in the committee.
In equilibrium, each committee member correctly anticipates the beliefs of the ex-
ternal evaluator and, before casting a vote, forms an expectation about the career
concern reward that he will receive as a function of his strategy. Suppose, rst, that
the state of the world is observed by the agent. Under public voting, each agent can
perfectly anticipate his career concern reward in equilibrium:
er!;p (vi) = Pr(t = cjv = !)Ifvi=!g; (6)
where we omit the index for the evaluators beliefs for simplicity. Under secret voting,
expected career concern reward depends also on how each agent expects other members
to vote: er!;s(vi) = Pr(t = cjv = !) 1n(Ifvi=!g + E(Pj 6=i Ifvj=!g)); (7)
where E(
P
j 6=i Ifvj=!g) is the number of correct votes expected to be cast by the other
committee members. Hence, under secret voting, the impact of an agents correct vote
on his own career concern is diluted in proportion to the size of the committee. When
the state of the world is not observed as it is the case, each agent must compute his
expected reward by averaging his career concern under each state:
er (vi) = qer!=A; (vi) + (1  q) er!=B; (vi) : (8)
Based on the elements dened above, and assuming that the state of the world is
A, the expected utility of a competent member can be expressed as a function of his
vote vi as follows:
Ui=A;(vi; si = A) = er!=A;(vi) + !=A(vi)(+ ) (9)
and
Ui=B;(vi; si = A) = er!=A;(vi) + !=A(vi)+ (1  !=A(vi)); (10)
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depending on whether the agent is biased towards A or B, respectively. Similar expres-
sions can be derived for the case where the state of the world is B: The next lemma
provides a general characterization of the behavior of competent members.14
Lemma 1. The behavior of competent members is characterized by the following
properties:
a: Both abstaining and voting against the bias are weakly dominated strategies for a
competent member whose bias is equal to the signal, si = i;
b: Abstaining is a weakly dominated strategy for a competent member whose bias is
di¤erent than the signal, si 6= i.
Intuitively, competent members observe the state of the world and, as a consequence,
are not subject to the swing voters curse(Feddersen and Pesendorfer [9]), i.e. the
risk of unwillingly shifting the committees decision away from the correct outcome.
Therefore, there is no reason for them to abstain, since by voting for either alternative
they can push the decision towards a particular outcome and abstentions are associated
with lack of competence. Lemma 1 also implies that a competent member who receives
a signal equal to his bias, si = i, always prefers (weakly) to vote in accordance with
the state of the world, given that both common and private interests are aligned in
this case, while a competent member who receives a signal di¤erent than his bias,
si 6= i, may either vote for the state of the world or in accordance with his bias. Note
that the above result guarantees that, in any equilibrium, every competent members
who is biased towards the state of the world votes correctly. Thus, by Bayes rule, the
likelihood that an agent is competent given that he voted correctly is strictly positive,
Pr(t = cjv = !) > 0. The next lemma follows as a direct implication of this result.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, a members expected career concern reward is always strictly
larger when he votes correctly rather than when he abstains or votes incorrectly:
er!;(vi = !) > er!;(vi 6= !)
Furthermore, we have that:
er!;p(vi = !) > er!;s(vi = !)
14All proofs can be found in Online Appendix C.
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and er!;p(vi 6= !) < er!;s(vi 6= !)
Interestingly, conditional on a correct vote, the expected career concern reward is larger
under public than under secret voting, whereas the opposite is the case conditional
on an incorrect vote or an abstention. Intuitively, this result follows from the fact
that under secrecy career concern rewards are distributed equally across members and
depend only on the total number of correct votes. The next lemma characterizes the
equilibrium behavior of incompetent members relative to competent ones.
Lemma 3. There exists no equilibrium in which a competent member who receives a
signal di¤erent than his bias votes against the state of the world and an incompetent
member abstains.
Intuitively, incompetent agents are relatively more inclined to follow their biases
by either voting for the ex-ante more likely alternative or for the alternative that
matches their bias types. When a competent agent decides to vote against his signal,
he knows for sure that he is casting an incorrect vote, while an incompetent agent
always attributes positive probability to the event that his vote is correct, in which case
he obtains larger career concern rewards. That is, incompetent agents are naively
optimistic that their vote will coincide with the state of the world, which makes them
more willing to vote even without having any information.
Finally, based on the above results, it is possible to show that there are only three
types of equilibria in the model.
Proposition 1. The equilibria of the model can be categorized into one of the following
classes:
i: A fully competent equilibrium, where all competent members vote in accordance
with the signal and all incompetent members abstain;
ii: A partially competent equilibrium, where all competent members vote in accor-
dance with the signal and not all incompetent members abstain;
iii: A biased equilibrium, where at least some competent members vote against their
signals and all incompetent members vote either to the ex-ante more likely alter-
native or in accordance with their biases.
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Note that this characterization holds under both public and secret voting, any value of
the prior and any distribution of types. However, the region of the parameters where
each class of equilibrium can be sustained do depend on the transparency of the voting
rule, as we shall discuss in detail in the next subsection.
4.2 Main Comparative Statics Results
In this subsection, we provide a characterization of each type of equilibrium under
secrete and public voting. Let the subscript  = ffull; part; biasg denote equilibrium
beliefs of all agents. The following proposition summarizes the main properties of the
fully competent equilibrium.
Proposition 2. A fully competent equilibrium can be sustained, if and only if
  full (; ; ; n) < :
Furthermore, if a fully competent equilibrium can be supported under public voting,
then it can also be supported under secret voting.
A fully competent equilibrium can be sustained only if the magnitude of the bias is
small relatively to the common value, and it is more likely to be supported under secret
voting. Intuitively, the interaction between transparency and career concerns creates
an incentive for incompetent members to vote, since abstaining perfectly reveals their
lack of competence in this case.
The next proposition provides a general characterization of the partially competent
equilibrium.
Proposition 3. A partially competent equilibrium can be sustained, if and only if

part
(; ; ; n)    part (; ; ; n) ;
where 
part
(; ; ; n) <  and part (; ; ; n) > : Furthermore, if a partially com-
petent equilibrium can be supported under secret voting, then it can also be supported
under public voting.
A partially competent equilibrium can be sustained even if the magnitude of the bias is
large relatively to the common value, and this equilibrium is more likely to be supported
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under public voting. Observe that transparency acts to counter-balance the e¤ect of
the bias in competent members by creating an incentive for them to vote correctly in
order to signal their competence. At the same time, it also provides incentive for the
incompetent members to vote rather than to abstain. In general, there is an overlap
between the region of parameters where a fully competent and a partially competent
equilibria can be supported.
Finally, the next proposition summarizes the main properties of the biased equilib-
rium.
Proposition 4. A biased equilibrium can be sustained, if and only if
 < 
bias
(; ; ; n)  ;
Furthermore, if a biased equilibrium can be supported under public voting, then it can
also be supported under secret voting.
A biased equilibrium is more likely to be sustained under secret voting since secrecy
reduces the career concern reward associated with a correct vote, and makes competent
members more willing to disregard their information about the state of the world and
vote in accordance with their biases.
Overall, our analysis highlights the fact that transparency a¤ects the behavior of
competent and incompetent agents in markedly di¤erent ways. On the one hand,
transparency attenuates the preexisting biases of competent members by inducing them
to vote correctly, even when the state of the world contradicts their biases. On the
other hand, transparency exacerbates the preexisting biases of incompetent members
by inducing them to vote either for the ex-ante more likely alternative or in accordance
with their biases to avoid revealing their lack of competence.
4.3 The Symmetric Case
In this subsection, we provide a precise characterization of the equilibria by assuming
that both the prior probability and the distribution of biases are symmetric, i.e. q =
p = 1=2. The symmetric prior assumption implies that, when an incompetent member
decides to vote, he will always vote for the alternative towards which he is biased, while
the uniform distribution of biases simplies the analysis by making the equilibrium
behavior of incompetent members symmetric between agents of di¤erent bias types.
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Under these assumptions, we derive closed forms for the thresholds dened above. The
following proposition characterizes the structure of the equilibria under both public
and secret voting.
Proposition 5. Suppose that q = p = 1=2, then
i: A fully competent equilibrium can be supported if and only if
  full (; ; ; n) 
(n  1)
2 + (n  3) 
 
1  n 1
n
If=sg

 
1 + n 3
2


(1  )n 2
ii: A partially competent equilibrium can be supported if and only if
  part (; ; ; n)  +
2n
 
1  n 1
n
If=sg

 
n 1
(n 1)=2

(1 + )
n+1
2 (1  )n 12
iii: A biased equilibrium can be supported if and only if
  
bias
(; ; ; n)  + 2
n 1
 
1  n 1
n
If=sg

 
n 1
(n 1)=2

Furthermore, full (; ; ; n) < 

bias
(; ; ; n) < part (; ; ; n), 
p
full (; ; ; n) <
sfull (; ; ; n), 
p
part(; ; ; n)> 
s
part (; ; ; n), and 
p
bias
(; ; ; n)> s
bias
(; ; ; n) :
The term n 1
n
If=sg which appears inside parenthesis in the above expressions captures
the e¤ect of the dilution of career concern under secret voting. Hence, a change from
public to secret voting is qualitatively equivalent to a reduction in the weight attached
to career concerns. Figure 1 shows the values of the parameters  and  for which
each class of equilibria can be sustained, given a level of transparency , and for xed
values of ,  and n.
Observe that since full < 

part, the region of parameters where a fully competent
equilibrium exists is contained inside the region where a partially competent equilib-
rium can be supported. Recall that the main reason for an incompetent member to
abstain is to avoid adding noise to the decision process. However, a coordination
issue arises in the region where the two equilibria overlap in that abstaining is only op-
timal for an incompetent member if he expects other incompetent members to abstain
13
as well. If, on the other hand, he expects other incompetent members to vote for their
biases, then it becomes optimal for him to also do so.
Similarly, since 
bias
< part, there exists a region of parameters where both a
partially competent and a biased equilibria can be sustained simultaneously. The
multiplicity of equilibria arises in this case due to the existence of a coordination
issue among competent members who are biased against the state of the world. In
equilibrium, either all of them vote correctly or all of them vote in accordance with
their biases.
Figure 2 summarizes the main comparative static results of the model. Observe that
in region I, where spart <  < 
p
part, a partially competent equilibrium can be sustained
under public but not under secret voting; while in region II, where pfull <  < 
s
full,
a fully competent equilibrium can be sustained under secret but not under public
voting. Intuitively, when the magnitude of the bias is relatively large, like in region I,
incompetent members always vote in accordance with their biases, but public voting
may actually induce competent members to vote correctly rather than to follow their
biases since this increases the career concern gain associated with a correct vote. On
the other hand, when the magnitude of the bias is relatively small, like in region II,
competent members always vote correctly, but secret voting may help incompetent
agents to abstain rather than to vote for their biases by reducing the expected career
concern gain associated with voting.
For each class of equilibrium, it can be shown that the probability of a correct
decision is given by
full = 1  12 (1  )n (11)
part =
Pn
i=(n+1)=2
 
n
i
  
 + 1
2
(1  )i  1
2
(1  )n i (12)
and
bias =
1
2
; (13)
with full > part > bias. Observe that the likelihood of a correct decision is lower
than one even under a fully competent equilibrium, given that with probability (1  )n
all committee members are incompetent, in which case the correct alternative would
be chosen only half of the time. It is also interesting to note that the expected di¤er-
ence in the quality of decisions between a fully competent and a partially competent
equilibrium increases with n, provided that the proportion of competent members is
small enough. Intuitively, the theoretical di¤erence between the two classes of equilib-
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ria is expected to be particularly pronounced whenever there is a large proportion of
incompetent agents in the committee. Given these results, it is possible to rank public
and secret voting in terms of the quality of decisions expected under each of them.
Proposition 6. Suppose that q = p = 1=2: In equilibrium, we have that
i: If spart (; ; ; n) <  < 
p
part (; ; ; n), then the probability of a correct deci-
sion under public voting is at least as large as under secret voting.
ii: If pfull (; ; ; n) <  < 
s
full (; ; ; n), then the probability of a correct deci-
sion under secret voting is at least as large as under public voting.
Thus, it follows that, when the magnitude of the bias is relatively large, a correct
decision is more likely under public voting; while when the magnitude of the bias is
relatively small, a correct decision is more likely under secret voting. Note that the
possible existence of multiple equilibria in both of the regions considered above prevents
us from ordering transparency and secrecy in strict terms, given that it is not possible
to guarantee that a change from public to secret voting, or vice-versa, will necessarily
lead to a change in the class of equilibrium that ultimately prevails. In light of this,
a controlled laboratory experiment is a particularly useful tool that can inform on
whether individuals coordinate on certain equilibria.
Finally, in the next proposition, we show that the region of parameters where it is
possible to sustain di¤erent classes of equilibria under public and secret voting becomes
larger as both the relevance of career concerns and the proportion of competent agents
increase.
Proposition 7. Suppose that q = p = 1=2. Then the distance ppart (; ; ; n)  
spart (; ; ; n) and the distance 
s
full (; ; ; n)  pfull (; ; ; n) are increasing in
 and .
Therefore, the more career oriented are the members of the committee and the larger
the proportion of competent agents, the larger is the region of parameters where the
choice between secret and public voting is expected to matter.15 Finally, it is possible to
15Intuitively, as  increases, the career concern gains associated with a correct vote under a partially
competent equilibrium increase, which generates an even stronger incentive for competent members to
vote correctly under public voting relatively to secret voting. At the same time, as  gets larger, the
probability that an uninformed agent is pivotal when he decides to cast a vote under a fully competent
equilibrium decreases, which diminishes the risk of the swing voters curse, thus increasing even more
the incentive for incompetent members to vote under public voting relatively to secret voting.
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show that these regions become arbitrarily large as the number of committee members
goes to innity, implying that our conclusions become possibly even more relevant for
large committees.
5 Career Concern Rewards
Throughout our analysis we have made a number of simplifying assumptions that
deserve to be discussed. In this section, we present a detailed analysis of the robustness
of our ndings to our non-standard modelling of career concerns. We cover other
generalizations and extensions of the basic model in the Online Appendix A.16
We have assumed in our basic model that the career concern reward of a committee
member is proportional to the conditional probability that the agent is competent
and voted correctly (see equation [1]). However, our main qualitative results would
remain the same even if we allow for the career concern reward to be based only on the
posterior probability that agent i is competent, r!;i  Pr( i = cj!; I). In particular,
both fully competent and partially competent equilibria would still be characterized by
Propositions 2 and 3, respectively, and all comparative static results regarding these
two types of equilibria would remain unchanged. The intuition is that in both cases
the career concern reward associated with a correct vote is strictly larger than that
associated with an abstention or an incorrect vote, since all competent members vote
correctly in equilibrium.17 It is in this sense that we can say that our basic conclusion
that transparency attenuates the biases of competent members while it exacerbates the
biases of incompetent members is robust to how career concern is dened.
The main implication of relaxing the assumption that career concern materializes
only in connection with a correct vote is that it is now possible to sustain a larger
set equilibria than those described in Proposition 1: In particular, we may also have
equilibria involving the following newbehaviors: (i) competent members with biases
that are consistent with the state of the world voting against the state of the world and
16In the Online Appendix A we discuss the assumption that the state of the world is observed
ex-post and study the case in which competent and incompetent members receive signals of di¤erent
precision. We elaborate on changes in the voting rule and in the assumption about what is revealed
ex-post under secret voting. We show that the model can be easily extended to the existence of
unbiased agents and to possible correlations between competence and bias. Finally, we examine the
implications of allowing for information sharing prior to the voting stage and we consider the incentives
of di¤erent types of agents to choose between secret and public voting.
17This result follows directly from Bayes rule since if all competent members vote correctly in
equilibrium then it must be that Pr (ti = cjvi 6= !) = 0.
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(ii) competent members abstaining. The next proposition provides a characterization
of some basic aspects of these equilibria.
Proposition 8. Assume that the career concern rewards depend only on the posterior
probability that the agent is competent, r!;i  Pr( i = cj!; I), then we have:
i: An equilibrium in which a competent member with bias equal to the state votes
against the state can be sustained only if the career concern reward associated
with an incorrect vote is strictly larger than that associated with a correct vote.
ii: An equilibrium in which a competent member with bias equal to the state abstains
can be sustained only if the career concern reward associated with an abstention
is strictly larger than that associated with a correct vote.
An equilibrium involving a competent member with bias equal to the state either ab-
staining or voting incorrectly requires a very particular structure of incentives, namely:
an agent who abstains or votes incorrectly must be seen as more likely to be compe-
tent than a member who votes correctly. There is an aspect of self-fullling prophecy
involved in such equilibria in that whatever the external evaluator expects competent
members to do, regardless of the correctness or incorrectness of the vote, may actually
happen provided that career concerns are large enough. We believe that this element
is not likely to be dominant in most applications of our model and this is one reason
why our initial assumption that career concern is related to the joint probability that
an agent is competent and voted correctly may be viewed as a reasonable form of
renement.18 Still, even if we do not take these issues into account, it is possible to
show that the equilibria discussed above can only exist in certain specic regions of
the parameter space.
Proposition 9. An equilibrium in which a competent member with bias equal to the
state either abstains or votes against the state can be sustained only if the sum of the
common value and the bias term, + , is small enough.
18Incidentally, in a di¤erent model where committee members have incentive to signal both that
they are competent and relatively unbiased, it would be reasonable to expect the existence of equilibria
where abstentions are associated with relatively large career concern rewards. Note that a situation
like that makes less sense in the context of our model, because here career concern depends solely on
competence. A formal analysis of this other version of the model is beyond the scope of the present
paper and is left for future research.
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Intuitively, since in this case the bias and the state of the world are aligned, voting for
the state would increase the likelihood that the agent gets a payo¤ of +: Therefore,
for such agent to have an incentive to either abstain or vote against the state of the
world, both the common value and the bias term must be su¢ ciently small.
Next, we dene that beliefs are monotone if the evaluators beliefs are such that
Pr(t =cjv = !; !)  Pr(t =cjv 6= !; !) for any !. Note that this condition implies that
the career concern reward associated with a correct vote is not strictly smaller than
that associated with an abstention or an incorrect vote, i.e. er!;i (vi = !)  er!;i (vi 6= !)
for ! 2 fA;Bg. Proceeding with our analysis, the following proposition provides a
characterization of the main properties of the equilibrium where a competent member
biased against the state of the world abstains.
Proposition 10. Assume that r!;i  Pr( i = cj!; I), then we have:
i: An equilibrium in which a competent member biased against the state abstains
can be sustained only if     is strictly positive and small enough.
ii: If in equilibrium a competent member biased against the state abstains, then a
competent member with bias equal to the state can never vote against the state.
iii: Any equilibrium with monotone beliefs where a competent member biased against
the state abstains can be sustained only if:
 < 
abst
(; ; ; n)    abst(; ; ; n)
Furthermore, we have that:
s
abst
(; ; ; n)  p
abst
(; ; ; n)
and
sabst(; ; ; n)  pabst(; ; ; n):
There are several interesting facts contained in the above proposition.
First, part (i) emphasizes that equilibria where competent members biased against
the state of the world abstain are not pervasive. In particular, they can only exist if
agents are somewhat indi¤erent between voting for the correct alternative and following
their biases.
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Second, we can provide a sharper characterization of the equilibrium by focusing
exclusively on equilibria with monotone beliefs. Indeed, as part (iii) of the proposition
shows, an equilibrium where a competent member biased against the state abstains can
only be sustained if the bias term is larger than the common value. Hence, combining
parts (i) and (iii) of Proposition 10, we have that under the monotone beliefs assump-
tion the bias term must be larger than the common value, but not too large, so that
    is small enough. Thus, equilibria where competent members biased against the
state abstain exist in a smallsubset of the parameters space case in the sense that
 can neither be too small nor too large relatively to , for otherwise agents would
have an incentive to vote correctly or to follow their biases, respectively. The fact
that we must have  >  for the equilibrium to be sustained is important, because it
guarantees that the region of parameters where an equilibrium involving a competent
member abstaining can never overlap with the region where a fully competent equilib-
rium exists. Therefore, our result that secret voting leads to better decisions when the
magnitude of the bias is small relative to the common value is not a¤ected in any way
by the possible existence of multiple equilibria in that region.
Third, while equilibria where competent members abstain can be supported in the
same region where a partially competent equilibrium exists, part (iii) of Proposition
10 also shows that public voting always leads competent members to behave better.
Specically, they are both more likely to abstain rather than to vote incorrectly, given
that sabst(; ; ; n)  pabst(; ; ; n), and more likely to vote correctly rather than
to abstain, since s
abst
(; ; ; n)  p
abst
(; ; ; n). Note, however, that this result
refers only to the behavior of competent agents, as it is not possible to guarantee
that incompetent agents will behave better as well. Intuitively, there may now exist a
region of parameters with  > , where it is possible to support an equilibrium where
both competent members biased against the state of the world and some incompetent
members abstain. In this case, a move from secrecy to transparency could lead both
competent members to vote correctly and incompetent members to vote for their biases.
However, there is a sense in which such equilibria are di¢ cult to be supported in that
they require a very particular set of conditions to hold. For example, in the symmetric
case discussed in Subsection 4:3, under the same parameter values used to construct
Figure 1, one can show that there exists no equilibrium with monotone beliefs where
a competent member abstains.19
19Specically, it is possible to show that an equilibrium where competent members biased against the
state abstain and, likewise, all incompetent members abstain can only be supported, in the symmetric
19
Finally, to complement these results, we can also show that if beliefs are monotone,
then a biased equilibrium is still characterized by the same properties stated in Propo-
sition 4, and it is still the case that such equilibrium is less likely to be sustained under
public voting.
6 Experimental Design
In this section we explore the main theoretical predictions of our model by means
of a controlled laboratory experiment. A controlled experiment allows us to both
collect data on individualsbehavior under secret and public voting, and compare the
quality of the committeesdecisions under these two treatments. Furthermore, since
the theoretical model features multiple equilibria with di¤erent information aggregation
properties, a controlled experiment can inform on equilibrium selection. Finally, as we
discuss in the Online Appendix A, the choice of voting rule may be endogenous to
the composition of the committee as well as to the types of decisions that are being
taken, and this has important implications for the empirical evaluation of the impact
of transparency on voting outcomes and individual behavior using non-experimental
data.
Given that our main goal is to evaluate whether the degree of transparency a¤ects
the behavior of individuals, and in order to highlight the key di¤erences between public
and secret voting, we amend the basic model imposing two simplifying assumptions
on the structure of career concern rewards. First, we assume that the career concern
reward associated with a correct vote is exogenous under both public and secret voting,
i.e. before voting, each committee member knows, and is guaranteed to receive, a
certain payo¤ R > 0,  2 fp; sg, whenever his or her vote is correct. Note that
this version of the model retains all basic features of the general model, except that
now we are not explicitly modelling the updating process of the external evaluator.
This assumption helps us to simplify the experiment by avoiding the need for an extra
subject whose role would be to guess the competence of each committee member,
a complex task that would certainly add a lot of noise to the experimental results.
Second, while it is natural to suppose that Rp > Rs, we further assume that Rs = 0,
i.e. the career concern gain associated with a correct vote is zero under secret voting
in order to sharpen the contrast between public and secret voting.
case, if the proportion of competent members, , is very large.
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While the additional assumptions above greatly simplify the model, its basic struc-
ture remains unchanged. In particular, the same three classes of equilibria still exist
and all previous comparative static results hold. We focus the experimental analysis on
committees of three members with uniform prior q = 1=2 and symmetric distribution
of both biases p = 1=2 and competent types  = 1=2. Under this parametrization, it
is possible to show that the conditions for the existence of a fully competent, partially
competent and biased equilibria are, respectively, the following:
  1
2
  2R (14)
  + 8
3
R (15)
and
  + 2R; (16)
where, as before,  is the common value,  is the bias term and R is the career concern
reward associated with a correct vote.20
We focus the analysis on parameter regions where a change in the transparency of
voting is expected to lead to a change in observed behavior. The choice of parameters
as well as the equilibrium predictions associated with each of the four treatments
considered in the experiments are summarized in Table 1. The common value is set
to  = 10 in all treatments, while the magnitude of the bias can be either low,  = 1,
or high,  = 14. Moreover, the career concern rewards are chosen so that the payo¤
associated with a correct vote is Rp = 9 under public voting and Rs = 0 under
secret voting. Accordingly, the treatments are labelled as: Low/Secret, Low/Public,
High/Secret and High/Public.
The experiments were conducted at the Bologna Laboratory for Experiments in So-
cial Science (BLESS) with registered undergraduates from the University of Bologna.
We run the experiments in 6 sessions, each consisting of 2 parts with a di¤erent treat-
ment being tested in each part. Each treatment was repeated for 32 periods, the rst
two of which being practice non-paid rounds. In every session, the value of the bias
term (low or high) was held xed and only the parameter corresponding to the career
concern reward (public or secret voting) changed from one part to the other. Table 2
summarizes the sequence of treatments and number of participants in each session. In
20See Online Appendix D for the derivation of these conditions.
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total, 144 distinct subjects took part in the experiments.
The experiment was implemented via computer terminals and programmed in z-
Tree. In every session, instructions were read aloud at the beginning of each part, after
which a short comprehension quiz was administered in order to check basic under-
standing of the rules.21 Subjects were randomly divided into groups of three members
and were re-assigned, in every period, to di¤erent groups using a random matching
procedure. The task of each group was to choose between two colors, blue or yellow.
The groups color (i.e. the state of the world) was ex-ante unknown and could be
either one of the two colors with equal probability.
Before voting, each individual received a message about the groups color that could
be either perfectly informative or non-informative with equal probability.22 Specically,
subjects were told that messages would be randomly assigned so that, among all par-
ticipants in a given session, half of them would receive a perfectly informative message
saying either blueor yellowdepending on the groups color, and the other half
would receive an uninformative message saying blue or yellow with equal probability,
in which case no new information would be added to what was previously known.23
At this point, we were explicit in emphasizing that this procedure did not guarantee
that there would always be an informed member in every group and that, in fact, the
number of informed individuals in a given committee could be anything between zero
and three.
Also before voting, each subject was informed about his or her role (i.e. bias),
which could be either blueor yellowwith equal probability. The procedure used
to assign individual colors was the same as described above: among all subjects present
in a given session, half of them was randomly assigned the blue color and the other half
was assigned the yellow color. After observing their messages and roles, each subject
21All participants were provided with a copy of the instructions they could consult at any moment
during the experiment. See Online Appendix E for a version of the instructions translated into English.
22In our discussion of the experiment, we will refer to subjects who receive informative messages
(competent) as informed and to subjects who receive non-informative messages (incompetent) as
uninformed.
23This distribution procedure was adopted in order to make the experiment as transparent as
possible. Note, however, that it introduces dependence in the distribution of messages in that if,
for instance, a subject receives an informative message, then it is slightly less likely that another
subject will receive an informative message as well. Formally, this happens because messages are
now being sampled without replacement, so that the distribution of informed members in a group
follows a hypergeometric distribution. As a consequence, the conditions for the existence of each class
of equilibria are now slightly di¤erent than (14)-(16). However, for the number of participants and
parameter values used in the experiments, all of our equilibrium predictions remain unchanged.
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had to choose whether to vote for blue or yellow or to abstain. The groups decision
was taken by majority rule and ties were broken randomly. At the end of each period,
subjects were provided with information about their groups color, the decision taken
and the number of members of the group that voted for Blue, Yellow or abstained.
The nal payo¤ in a given period was such that if the groups decision was equal
to the groups color, then each member of the group received 10 points. Moreover, if
the groups decision was equal to the individual color of one of its members, then he
or she received 1 extra point under low bias treatments and 14 extra points under high
bias treatments. Finally, under public voting treatments, subjects were also given an
additional payo¤ of 9 points if his or her vote was equal to the groups color, while
no points were given to a correct vote under secret voting treatments. The points
obtained during the experiment were converted to Euros at a rate of 1e per 80 points
and participants were paid the sum of their earnings over the 60 paid periods at the
end of the experiment. The average earning was around e13:9, including a show-up
fee of e2, with each session lasting for approximately 60 minutes.
7 Experimental Results
7.1 Decisions
We begin our analysis of the experimental results by investigating how the degree of
transparency a¤ects the quality of the committeesdecisions, as measured by the pro-
portion of correct choices made by the committees. Table 3 presents the fraction of
correct decisions observed under each treatment, alongside with the fractions predicted
by the model. Observe, rst, that the quality of the decisions is slightly higher un-
der Low/Secret (85:56%) than Low/Public (84:31%), whereas the fraction of correct
decisions under High/Secret (59:58%) is signicantly lower than under High/Public
(81:53%), as expected.
7.2 Individual Choices
Table 4 summarizes the aggregate choices of uninformed subjects. Note that, when the
magnitude of the bias is low, uninformed voters are much more likely to abstain under
secret (44:17%) than public voting (18:98%), while being signicantly more likely to
vote in accordance with their biases under public (64:81%) than secret voting (46:20%).
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On the other hand, when the magnitude of the bias is high, the vast majority of unin-
formed subjects vote in accordance with their biases under both secret (87:96%) and
public voting (84:26%). These results are all in line with our theoretical comparative
statics. It should be noted that while 18:98% of subjects abstain under Low/Public,
this number decreases substantially when we account for sequencing e¤ects (see the
Online Appendix B). We also observe between 3% and 16% of uninformed agents vot-
ing against their biases depending on the treatment. Interestingly, the incentive to
vote against the bias seems to be larger under public voting, which may be interpreted
as evidence that some individuals do so as part of a gamble to guess the state of the
world. This nding is consistent with experimental results previously obtained by El-
bittar et al [7], who argue that a large proportion of uninformed subjects vote based
on hunches(subjective beliefs).24
In Table 5 we summarize the behavior of informed voters who received a signal
di¤erent than their biases. Among informed agents, these individuals are the ones
most interesting to our analysis, since they face a trade-o¤between voting correctly and
voting for their biases. Observe that, as predicted by the theory, when the magnitude
of the bias is high, these subjects are much more inclined to vote correctly under
public (84:60%) than secret voting (21:86%), while when the magnitude of the bias is
small, the vast majority of them vote correctly under both secret (95:96%) and public
voting (97:71%). The percentage of individuals who vote correctly under High/Secret
(21:86%) and the percentage of individuals who vote in accordance with their biases
under High/Public (11:94%) are larger than expected. We note, however, that these
proportions tend to decrease when we account for learning and sequencing e¤ects.25
We also observe a fraction of informed voters who abstain under High/Secret (14:70%).
This result is puzzling given that, in theory, abstaining is weakly dominated for agents
of this type. A possible explanation for this result could be attributed to the fact that
both the common value (10 points) and the bias (14 points) are relatively in close
magnitude, so that some informed subjects may simply prefer to abstain.
Finally, it is interesting to see how the degree of transparency a¤ects the voting
proles of groups. We start by examining the frequency with which the observed voting
proles are exactly in accordance with one of the three classes of theoretical equilibria.
In order to do so, we restrict the sample to include only decisions that involved at
least one uninformed agent and one informed agent who received a signal di¤erent
24Similar ndings are also in Guarnaschelli et al [16] and in Bouton et al [5].
25See Online Appendix B for a detailed discussion.
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than his bias. This restriction is imposed in order to allow us to associate each voting
prole to a single class of equilibria. As shown in Table 6, the proportion of voting
proles that are consistent with a fully competent equilibrium decreases, as expected,
from 33:23% under Low/Secret to 15:73% under Low/Public. Note that this reduction
is accompanied by a proportional increase in the proles compatible with a partially
competent equilibrium from 35:00% under Low/Secret to 51:96% under Low/Public.
Moreover, the fraction of voting proles consistent with a biased equilibrium drops
signicantly from 48:71% under High/Secret to 8:56% under High/Public. Again,
this reduction is accompanied by an increase in the proles compatible with a partially
competent equilibrium from 17:47% under High/Secret to 63:47% under High/Public.26
We also nd evidence (not reported in Table 6) that the percentage of voting proles
consistent with a fully competent equilibrium under Low/Secret, a treatment in which
there are multiple equilibria, increases substantially within the treatment. This result
provides extra indication that subjects were gradually learning to coordinate on the
more e¢ cient equilibrium. In fact, the percentage of voting proles that are exactly
in line with a fully competent equilibrium increases from 27:11% in periods 1-10 to
29:31% in periods 11-20 to, nally, 44:33% in periods 21-30.
7.3 Regression Analysis
We now present a detailed regression analysis of the results of the experiment. The fact
that the same subjects were exposed to two di¤erent treatments, allows us to perform
a rigorous analysis controlling for individual xed e¤ects.27 We start by examining
the determinants of a correct vote by informed agents. Table 7 presents the results
of linear probability models where the dependent variable is a dummy that equals
one if the individual voted correctly and zero otherwise. The sample is restricted to
subject-period observations where the agent received a signal di¤erent than his bias.
Furthermore, we focus only on high bias treatments, i.e. High/Secret and High/Public,
since these are the cases where we expect a change in the degree of transparency to
have an impact on voting behavior. All standard errors were clustered at the individual
26Note that in all treatments there is a signicant percentage of voting proles that cannot be
strictly categorized in one of the three classes of equilibria. Observe, however, that the fact that a
voting prole belongs to this residual category, which we denote by others, does not necessarily mean
that individual behavior is incompatible with rationality. In fact, there are other classes of equilibria
that may involve either asymmetric and/or mixed strategies, which we have not characterized in our
theoretical analysis, but may be played in practice.
27Our results remain unchanged when we control for random e¤ects instead of xed e¤ects.
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level.28
We begin by presenting in column [1] the results of a simple OLS regression of
correct vote on High/Secret. Consistently with previous ndings, a change from public
to secret voting leads to a signicant 62:7 percentage points (p.p.) decrease in the
likelihood that an informed agent votes correctly. Note that, as shown in column [2],
this result is very robust to controlling for individual xed e¤ects, as can be observed
by the fact that the estimated coe¢ cient remains almost unchanged.29 Next, in column
[3], we estimate the impact of High/Secret on the likelihood of a correct vote separately
in periods 1-10; 11-20 and 21-30.30 We nd that a change from public to secret voting
reduces the probability of a correct vote by 56:5 p.p. in periods 1-10, 60:4 p.p. in
periods 11-20 and 68:3 p.p. in periods 21-30, which corroborates the existence of a
strong learning e¤ect for informed voters.31
Finally, we create a dummy variable that captures whether a subject performed
poorly in the comprehension quizzes administered before the beginning of each treat-
ment.32 We interpret a low performance in these tests as evidence that either the
individual did not fully understand a particular aspect of the experiment or, perhaps
more likely, that he or she did not put enough e¤ort to think through the questions.
The results reported in column [4] shows that subjects who performed poorly in the
comprehension quiz are less responsive to changes in the degree of transparency; in
particular, they are 26:4 p.p. more likely to vote correctly under High/Secret, a treat-
ment in which we would expect all informed subjects to vote in accordance with their
biases.
We now proceed to examine the determinants of abstention by uninformed voters.
Table 8 presents the results of linear probability models where the dependent variable
is a dummy that equals one if the agent abstained and zero otherwise. The sample is
28Clustering by session and adjusting the standard errors to account for the small number of clusters
using a procedure proposed by Ibragimov and Müller [20] does not change any of our main results.
29Note that the individual xed e¤ects already control for all session specic characteristics, includ-
ing the order of the treatments and general characteristics of the pool of participants.
30Our results are robust to an alternative specication where we include an interaction between
High/Secret and a single period variable that assumes values between 1 and 30:
31The null hypothesis that these three estimates are identical is rejected at 5% condence level
(F = 3:21). See Online Appendix B for additional details.
32Before the beginning of each treatment, and immediately after instructions were read aloud, sub-
jects were asked to answer a short comprehension quiz consisting of several multiple choice questions.
While these questions were simple in general, most of them required calculation of hypothetical pay-
o¤s under various scenarios. An individual is dened to have performed poorly in the comprehension
quiz if the number of questions he or she got wrong was above average. Our results are robust to
alternative denitions of bad performance.
26
restricted to subject-period observations where the agent did not receive any informa-
tion about the state of the world. The analysis focuses only on low bias treatments,
i.e. Low/Secret and Low/Public. All standard errors were clustered at the individual
level.33 We, rst, present in column [1] the results of a simple OLS regression of ab-
stention on Low/Secret. The estimates conrm our previous ndings that uninformed
agents are more likely to abstain under secret voting. In particular, a change from
public to secret voting leads to a 25:1 p.p increase in the probability that an unin-
formed agent abstains. Moreover, as shown in column [2], this result is very robust
to the inclusion of individual xed e¤ects in the regression. Next, in column [3], we
estimate the impact of the Low/Secret treatment on the likelihood of abstention sepa-
rately in periods 1-10; 11-20 and 21-30. The results corroborate the previous evidence
that there is substantial learning occurring within a treatment, even after controlling
for individual xed e¤ects. Specically, the impact of a change from public to secret
voting on the probability that an uninformed voter abstains is 20:5 p.p. in periods
1-10, 24:7 p.p. in periods 11-20 and 27:6 p.p. in periods 21-30.
Overall, the above results are consistent with our main comparative static pre-
dictions about the behavior of uninformed voters. Still, the fraction of subjects who
change from voting to abstaining as a result of a change from public to secret voting
is signicantly below one. Given that there are multiple equilibria under Low/Secret,
it would be interesting to better understand why uninformed voters do not coordinate
more heavily on the Pareto optimal equilibrium, which involves all of them abstaining
in order to let the expertsdecide. Our discussion here is related to previous studies
by Elbittar et. al [7], and Grosser and Seebauer [15] who found, in a setting with com-
mon values, that a substantial proportion of individuals vote even though they have
no information about the state of the world.
One possible explanation for this nding could be attributed to the fact that some
subjects may simply have failed to recognize the advantages associated with abstain-
ing. Indeed, some degree of sophistication is required to understand that, under some
circumstances, doing nothingmay be better than trying to inuence the voting out-
come (Feddersen and Pesendorfer [9]). In order to investigate this hypothesis, we run
a xed e¤ect regression including the interaction between Low/Secret and the dummy
for poor performance in the comprehension quiz. The results reported in column [4]
show that subjects who perform badly in the quiz tend to be much less responsive to
33As before, clustering by session and adjusting the standard errors to account for the small number
of clusters does not change any of our main results.
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changes in the degree of transparency. In particular, our estimates imply that these
individuals are approximately 16:4 p.p. less likely to abstain under Low/Secret.
An alternative explanation for the relatively low levels of abstention is that, while
some individuals may have recognized the potential benets of abstaining, they were
discouraged from doing so by the fact that other uninformed agents were not abstain-
ing as well. Indeed, the optimal behavior for an uninformed agent is for him to vote
in accordance with his bias if he believes that other uniformed agents are also voting
in accordance with their biases. In order to examine whether a negative feedback in
one period impacts the subsequent decisions of agents, we dene a bad abstention
as a situation where an uninformed subjects abstains, but the decision of his or her
group is incorrect, meaning that at least one other committee member distortedthe
decision by voting for the wrong alternative. We count the number of bad abstentions
experienced by each subject during the rst ten periods of Low/Secret and add the
interaction of this variable with the Low/Secret dummy in a xed e¤ects regression.
In doing so, we restrict the estimation sample to include only observations from the
last twenty periods of each treatment (periods 11-30). We also control for the num-
ber of times that each subject abstained when uninformed in the rst ten rounds of
Low/Secret, given that an agent who abstains in the beginning of the treatment is
more likely to continue doing so. The results reported in column [5] show that ceteris
paribus a bad abstention in the rst ten periods reduces the probability of an absten-
tion in subsequent rounds by 13:9 p.p., suggesting that coordination problems among
uninformed voters may have, indeed, signicantly limited the convergence of voting
behavior towards the Pareto optimal equilibrium.
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Public versus Secret Voting in Committees
Online Appendix (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
This online appendix is organized as follows: section A discusses a number of extensions to our
benchmark model, section B presents additional experimental results omitted from the main text,
section C collects the proofs of the propositions of the paper, section D presents the derivation of
the version of the model tested in the lab and, nally, section E presents the English version of the
experiment instructions.
Appendix A. Discussion and Extensions
This section discusses a number of assumptions which we have made throughout our main analysis
as well as some possible extensions to our basic model.
A.1 Ex-Post Observability of the State of the World
An important assumption in our model is that the external evaluator always observes the state
of the world ex-post. This feature guarantees that, under transparency, voting for the correct
alternative is always associated with strictly positive career concern rewards, whereas an incorrect
vote is not rewarded in equilibrium. Note that if the evaluator did not observe the state of the world,
then the role played by career concerns in providing incentives for agents to vote correctly would be
weakened. In particular, as emphasized by Canes-Wrone et al [2], the desire to acquire reputation
could create an incentive for committee members to ignore whatever information they might have
about the state of the world and simply vote for the alternative which the evaluator believes is more
likely to be the correct one.1 Furthermore, as in Swank and Visser [10], there would be an incentive
for the members of the committee to show internal agreement, since competent agents always
receive the same signal. The incentive to pander to the evaluators opinion makes transparency in
committees less appealing in general, a result also emphasized by Stasavage [9]. Finally, note that
the assumption that the external evaluator observes the state of the world seems plausible whenever
the evaluator himself is either an expert or very well-informed about the environment in which the
decision is taking place. Consider, for instance, the case of an institutional investor evaluating the
performance of a mutual fund, the marketevaluating the performance of a monetary committee
or a constituency evaluating the performance of a legislature deciding on policies that have direct
impact on their daily lives.
1See Morris [8] and Maskin and Tirole [7] for studies that also emphasize the importance of pandering incentives
in principal-agent models.
A.2 Precision of Signals
Following Feddersen and Pesendorfer [4] and Battaglini et al [1], our analysis assumed that compe-
tent members receive perfectly informative signals about the state of the world, while incompetent
members received no information at all. Although our main results do rely on the hypothesis
that the precision of signals received by competent and incompetent model be su¢ ciently di¤erent,
the extreme assumption of perfectly informative and non-informative signals is not crucial for our
results. Formally, our main comparative static results regarding the impact of public and secret
voting on the behavior of committee members would still hold in an environment where competent
agents received signals with precision Pr (s = !j!) = 1  ", while incompetent agents received sig-
nals with precision Pr (s = !j!) = 12 + , for ! 2 fA;Bg, " > 0 and  > 0, provided that " and 
are relatively small. In particular, the set of possible equilibria would still consist of the same three
classes of equilibria characterized in Proposition 1, although the precise conditions for the existence
of each class of equilibrium would have to be adjusted in order to take into account the fact that
competent agents may now vote for the incorrect alternative even if they follow their signals.
A.3 Voting Rule and Degree of Transparency
Throughout the analysis we have assumed that the main di¤erence between public and secret
voting is that, while all votes are observed under public voting, only the vote tally is revealed under
secret voting. Note that, in this case, neither the nal decision of the committee nor the size of
the majority required for an alternative to be chosen has any impact on the evaluators posterior
beliefs, given that the observation of the aggregate voting outcome alone provides strictly more
information about the behavior of agents than knowledge of the committees decision and/or the
voting rule. As a consequence, a change in the size of the majority required for an alternative to
be approved would have no major impact on our main qualitative results. If we had assumed, as
in Levy [6] and Swank and Visser [10], that only the nal decision of the committee is observed
under secrecy, then the voting rule would have played a more important role in determining how
much information is conveyed to the evaluator. Nonetheless, our basic comparative static results
would remain unchanged, since the dilution of career concern rewards, the key mechanism behind
our results, would still be present under secret voting.
A.4 Unbiased Agents
Although our basic model assumes that all committee members are biased towards one of the
alternatives, the main qualitative results of the analysis are robust to allowing for the existence of
unbiased agents. In fact, note that unbiased competent members would always have an incentive
to follow their signals, since they care only about the common value and the career concern reward
associated with a correct vote, while unbiased incompetent members would always be more willing
to abstain relatively to biased agents of the same type. Now, given these observations, it would be
interesting to consider what would happen if we allowed for the existence of correlation between
the voterslevel of competence and their biases. Suppose, for instance, that we expected competent
members to be ideologically more neutral and consider, in particular, the extreme case where all
competent members are unbiased, whereas incompetent members may be either biased or unbiased.
Observe that in this case competent agents would always have an incentive to vote for the correct
alternative, so that the degree of transparency would have no impact on their behavior. For
incompetent agents, on the other hand, public voting would always make them more willing to
vote, so that we should expect secret voting to lead to better decisions. Conversely, if competent
members were either biased or unbiased and all incompetent members were unbiased, then none
of our main comparative static results would change. Observe that unbiased incompetent agents
would still have an incentive to vote due to career concerns, though they would not have a preferred
alternative in this case. Therefore, the basic trade-o¤ between public and secret voting would
remain unchanged, although the region of the parameters where a fully competent equilibrium can
be sustained would be larger in this case.
A.5 Information Sharing
Throughout the analysis we have assumed that the signals received by the members of the committee
were private and that competent agents were not allowed to share their information with other
players. In this subsection, we discuss whether competent agents would actually have an incentive
to reveal their information and how this decision could impact our basic comparative static results.
In a setting where the membersinterests are aligned, Coughlan [3] showed that voters would have
strong incentives to share information, since this can only lead to a larger probability that the right
decision is taken. However, the direction of incentives in our setting is not so clear-cut given the
presence of biases and career concerns. For instance, competent members may prefer not to reveal
their private information in order to separate themselves from incompetent agents. Moreover, a
competent member may be particularly unwilling to share information if he is biased against the
state of the world, since revealing information in this case could lead to the correct decision being
taken with higher likelihood.
Let us consider a version of the basic model where we introduce a mechanismthat collects all
private signals and reveals them truthfully to the committee before the voting stage.2 Note that,
in this case, all members become fully informed about the state of the world whenever there is at
least one competent agent in the group. Furthermore, it is possible to show that, if all members
are informed, then there can be only two symmetric equilibria: one in which all members vote in
accordance with the state of the world and another one in which all members vote for their biases.
In particular, we can show that the equilibrium where all vote correctly always exists, whereas
the equilibrium where all vote for their biases can only be sustained if the size of the bias is large
relatively to the common value.3 Naturally, there is no incentive for anyone to abstain in this case.
2For a general model of committee decision making with deliberation, see Gerardi and Yariv [5].
3Observe that if an informed agent expects all other members to vote correctly, then he is never pivotal and better
o¤ by also voting correctly, since by doing so he guarantees himself larger career concern rewards. Therefore, the
equilibrium where all vote in accordance with the state of the world can be sustained for all possible parameter values.
Would competent members actually have incentive to voluntarily participate in the mechanism
described above? Note that career concern rewards of competent agents are signicantly diluted
under the mechanism, since information sharing prevents them distinguishing from the incompetent
agents. In particular, the external evaluator now applies an extra discount to the career concern
reward assigned to any correct vote in order to account for the fact that incompetent members
may also learn the state of the world. It then follows that the willingness of competent members
to take part in the mechanism should be especially low if voting is public, since the losses caused
by the dilution e¤ect are larger in this case. Similarly, they are less likely to share information
when the size of the committee is large and when the importance attached to career concerns is
high. On the other hand, competent members are more likely to participate in the mechanism if
the common value is high relatively to the bias, given that information sharing is expected to lead
to better decisions in this case.
Thus, from a normative point of view, it follows that if all members are expected to vote
correctly after information is collected and shared, then secret voting is more likely to lead to
better decisions, since it makes competent agents more willing to participate in the mechanism
ex-ante. Alternatively, if the members of the committee are expected to vote in accordance with
their biases even after information about the state is revealed, then the quality of the decisions
cannot be improved by the mechanism. In fact, under certain conditions, public voting could
lead to better decisions in this case by creating incentives for competent members to withhold
information and then vote correctly in equilibrium (i.e. partially competent equilibrium). Overall,
these results reinforce our previous conclusions and highlight another dimension in which the degree
of transparency might be relevant for the quality of decisions.
A.6 Institutional Preferences
Which level of transparency would the members of the committee prefer if, prior to voting, they
could choose between public and secret voting? Here, we examine the institutional preferences of
committee members by competence type. As discussed before, the choice between public and secret
voting a¤ects the payo¤s of agents both in terms of how the career concern rewards are distributed
across agents and the likelihood that the correct decision is taken. Observe that, overall, due to the
dilution e¤ect, competent members are more likely to prefer public voting, whereas incompetent
members are more likely to prefer secret voting. There are, however, some interesting exceptions
to this general observation. First, if the weight associated with career concerns is small and the
common value is high relatively to the bias, then competent members may actually prefer a secret
voting rule, since secrecy is more likely to lead to better decisions in this case. Furthermore,
whenever a biased equilibrium is expected to prevail anyway, then competent agents who are biased
against the state of the world would actually prefer a secret voting rule, since in this case they always
receive zero career concern rewards under public voting. Overall, our discussion highlights the fact
that the choice of voting rule may be endogenous to the composition of the committee as well as
to the types of decisions that are being taken, a result that has important implications for the
empirical evaluation of the impact of transparency on voting outcomes and individual behavior
using non-experimental data.
Appendix B. Additional Experimental Results
B.1 Learning E¤ects
This subsection investigates whether learning within a treatment a¤ects the behavior of voters. In
fact, as individuals become more familiar with the structure of the game, we would expect their
choices to converge towards the theoretical predictions of the model. In order to test whether
this is the case, we compare the aggregate behavior of voters across periods 1-10, 11-20 and 21-30
and check whether any pattern emerges from the data. Table B:1 reports the aggregate choices of
uninformed voters. Note, rst, that abstentions under Low/Secret are signicantly higher in later
periods, increasing from 39:17% in periods 1-10 to 48:33% in period 21-30. Furthermore, we observe
an increase in the percentage of uninformed subjects who vote for their biases under High/Secret
from 85:83% in periods 1-10 to 90.83% in periods 21-30. Both of these results are consistent with
the learning hypothesis in that they show that the observed behavior tends to converge towards
the predictions of the model.
Next, Table B:2 reports separately for periods 1-10, 11-20 and 21-30 the aggregate choices of
informed voters who received a signal di¤erent than their biases. Note, rst, that the percentage
of informed subjects who vote in accordance with their signals under High/Secret decreases from
25:88% in periods 1-10 to 16:57% in periods 21-30. We also observe a signicant reduction in
the proportion of subjects who vote for their biases under High/Public from 17:20% in periods
1-10 to 5:00% in periods 21-30. While these result are consistent with the learning hypothesis,
the percentage of abstentions under High/Secret increases slightly from 12:94% in periods 1-10 to
18:86% in periods 21-30. As conjectured in section 7:2 of the paper, this result could be due to the
fact that both common and private values are relatively close to each other in our setting. Thus,
it is possible that some informed agents may have simply decided to abstain as a result of being
practicallyindi¤erent between the two alternatives.
B.2 Sequencing E¤ects
This subsection investigates whether the main comparative static results presented in section 7:3
are robust to the sequence of treatments. Table B.3 summarizes the behavior of uninformed voters
by sequence and treatment. Observe that, consistently with previous results, the percentage of
abstentions is signicantly higher under Low/Secret than under Low/Public irrespective of the order
of treatments; that is, when the magnitude of the bias is low, abstentions are always higher under
secret voting. However, the order of treatments does seem to a¤ect the behavior of uninformed
voters in one dimension, namely the proportion of abstentions is signicantly higher when the
session starts with Low/Secret.4 Thus, it seems that once an individual learns to behave in a
certain way (e.g. abstaining or voting for his bias), he will tend to repeat the same behavior in later
treatments even though it is no longer optimal for him to do so. Nonetheless, it is interesting to
observe that the reduction in abstentions associated with a change from Low/Secret to Low/Public
is almost identical in both sequences and approximately equal to 25%. Thus, while the order of
treatments a¤ects the baseline abstention rate, it has no impact on the size of the treatment e¤ect
itself.
Next, Table B.4 reports the behavior of informed voters broken down by sequence and treat-
ment, focusing, as before, on the individuals who received a signal di¤erent than their biases.
Observe that our main comparative static result is robust to the order of treatments, namely: un-
der both sequences, when the magnitude of the bias is high, the proportion of informed individuals
who vote in accordance with their signals is signicantly higher under public voting. However, it
should be noted that the proportion of subjects who vote correctly under High/Public is larger
when the session starts with High/Public (89:62%) than when it starts with High/Secret (82:28%).
Furthermore, a change from High/Secret to High/Public leads to an increase of 68:79% (=82:28%  
13:49%) in the percentage of correct votes when the session starts with High/Secret in comparison
with an increase of 51:55% (=89:62%   38:07%) when the session starts with High/Public. Thus,
it seems that a change in behavior from voting incorrectly to voting correctly is more likely to occur
than the opposite.
Appendix C. Proofs
C.1 Lemma 1
Suppose, without loss of generality, that the state of the world is ! = A: (All arguments are valid for
the opposite case, where ! = B:) Consider, rst, the behavior of a competent member whose signal,
si = A, is equal to his bias, i = A. Given the beliefs of the external evaluator and the strategies
of other players, the expected payo¤s associated with each of his pure strategies, vi 2 fA; ;; Bg,
are the following:
Ui=A;(vi = A; si = A) = er!=A;(vi = A) + !=A (vi = A) (+ )
Ui=A;(vi = ;; si = A) = er!=A;(vi = ;) + !=A (vi = ;) (+ )
Ui=A;(vi = B; si = A) = er!=A;(vi = B) + !=A (vi = B) (+ ) ;
where:
!=A (vi = B)  !=A (vi = ;)  !=A (vi = A) (C.1)
4Note that the percentage of subjects who abstain under Low/Secret is 47:65% when the session starts with
Low/Secret and 33:70% when the session starts with High/Secret: Similarly, the percentage of subjects who abstain
under High/Secret is 22:59% when the session starts with Low/Secret but only 8:15% when the session starts with
High/Secret:
er!=A;(vi = ;) = er!=A;(vi = B)  er!=A;(vi = A); (C.2)
i.e. voting for A leads to a larger probability that the committees decision is A and is also associated
with a higher career concern rewards. Thus, it follows that:
max
n
Ui=A;(vi = ;; si = A); Ui=A;(vi = B; si = A)
o
 Ui=A;(vi = A; si = A) (C.3)
Therefore, both voting against the signal and abstaining are weakly dominated strategies for a
competent member whose signal is equal to his bias.
Next, consider the behavior of a competent member whose signal, si = A, is di¤erent than his
bias, i = B. Given the beliefs of the external evaluator and the strategies of other players, the
expected payo¤s associated with each of his pure strategies, vi 2 fA; ;; Bg, are the following:
Ui=B;(vi = A; si = A) = er!=A;(vi = A) + !=A (vi = A)+  1  !=A (vi = A) 
Ui=B;(vi = ;; si = A) = er!=A;(vi = ;) + !=A (vi = ;)+  1  !=A (vi = ;) 
Ui=B;(vi = B; si = A) = er!=A;(vi = B) + !=A (vi = B)+  1  !=A (vi = B) 
Note that the conditions (C:1) and (C:2) still hold in this case, so that if   , then:
Ui=B;(vi = ;; si = A)  Ui=B;(vi = A; si = A); (C.4)
whereas if  < , then:
Ui=B;(vi = ;; si = A)  Ui=B;(vi = B; si = A) (C.5)
Therefore, abstaining is a weakly dominated strategy for a competent member whose signal is
di¤erent than his bias. 
C.2 Lemma 2
In any equilibrium where committee members do not use weakly dominated strategies, it must be
the case that every competent member whose signal is equal to his bias votes correctly, vi = !
(Lemma 1, part a). Therefore, by the Bayesrule, the probability that an agent is competent given
that he voted correctly is strictly positive:
Pr(t = cjv = !) > 0
Given the beliefs of the external evaluator, it follows from equations (6) and (7) in the paper that
the expected career concern gains associated with a correct vote under public and secret voting
are, respectively given, by: er!;p (vi = !) = Pr(t = cjv = !) (C.6)
and er!;s(vi = !) = Pr(t = cjv = !): 1n(1+E(Pj 6=i Ifvj=!g)); (C.7)
while the expected career concern gains associated with an abstention or an incorrect vote under
public and secret voting are, respectively, given by:
er!;p (vi 6= !) = 0 (C.8)
and er!;s(vi 6= !) = Pr(t = cjv = !): 1nE(Pj 6=i Ifvj=!g)) (C.9)
Therefore, since Pr(t = cjv = !) > 0, we have that:
er!;(vi = !) > er!;(vi 6= !);
for  2 fp,sg:
Furthermore, observe that: er!;p (vi = !) > er!;s(vi = !)
and er!;p (vi 6= !) < er!;s(vi 6= !);
since 0 < 1nE(
P
j 6=i Ifvj=!g)) < 1: 
C.3 Lemma 3
Suppose, for concreteness and without loss of generality, that the state of the world is ! = A
and consider the behavior of a competent member whose bias is B. Suppose, in addition, that in
equilibrium all competent members biased towards B vote against the state of the world. In this
case, we must have that:
Ui=B;(vi = B; si = A)  Ui=B;(vi = A; si = A); (C.10)
so that, by equation (10) in the paper, we have:
er!=A;(B) + !=A(B)+ (1  !=A(B))  er!=A;(A) + !=A(A)+ (1  !=A(A))
Note that since er!=A;(B) < er!=A;(A), i.e. the career concern reward associated with a correct
vote is strictly larger than that associated with an incorrect vote (by Lemma 2), and !=A(B) 
!=A(A), i.e. the probability that the decision is A is larger when the agent votes for A than when
he votes for B, the above inequality holds if, and only if:
 > ; (C.11)
i.e. the bias term must be strictly larger than the common value. Furthermore, from Lemma 1,
part b, it follows that, when  > , we must have:
Ui=B;(vi = B; si = A)  Ui=B;(vi = ;; si = A) (C.12)
and by the same token:
Ui=A; (vi = A; si = B)  Ui=A; (vi = ;; si = B) (C.13)
Let us now consider the behavior of an incompetent member biased towards B. We want to
show that it can never be optimal for agents of this type to abstain. Remember that the expected
utility of committee members of this type is given by:
Ui=B; (vi; si = ;) = qUi=B; (vi; si = A) + (1  q)Ui=B; (vi; si = B) ;
where q 2 (0; 1) is the prior probability that the state of the world is A. In this case, we can show
that voting forB is preferred than abstaining, since Ui=B; (vi = B; si = A) Ui=B; (vi = ;; si = A),
by (C.12), and Ui=B; (vi = B; si = B) > Ui=B; (vi = ;; si = B), since the bias and the state of
the world are aligned in this case and, by Lemma 2, the career concern reward associated with a
correct vote is strictly larger. Thus, for any prior q 2 (0; 1), we have:
Ui=B; (vi = B; si = ;) > Ui=B; (vi = ;; si = ;)
Next, consider the behavior of an incompetent member biased towards A. As before, we want
to show that it can never be optimal for members of this type to abstain. The expected utility of
these agents can be expressed as:
Ui=A; (vi; si = ;) = qUi=A; (vi; si = A) + (1  q)Ui=A; (vi; si = B)
Here, it is possible to show that voting for A is preferred than abstaining. In fact, note that
Ui=A; (vi = A; si = B)  Ui=A; (vi = ;; si = B) by (C:13), and Ui=A; (vi = A; si = A) >
Ui=A; (vi = ;; si = A), since the bias and the state of the world are aligned in this case and, by
Lemma 2, the career concern reward associated with a correct vote is strictly larger. Thus, for any
prior q 2 (0; 1), we have:
Ui=A; (vi = A; si = ;) > Ui=A; (vi = ;; si = ;)
Note that none of the above results depend on the value of the prior probability, so that a
similar argument applies to the case where B is the state of the world. 
C.4 Proposition 1
We focus on symmetric pure-strategy equilibria where agents do not use weakly dominated strate-
gies. From Lemma 1, it follows that competent members never abstain in equilibrium. Therefore,
we can divide their possible equilibrium strategies into two categories: either (a) they all vote in
accordance with the signal; or (b) some of them vote against the signal. Next, from Lemma 3, it
follows that incompetent agents never abstain when a competent member votes against the state
of the world, which corresponds to the situation described in case (b) above. Therefore, combining
the results in Lemmas 1 and 3, the result follows. 
C.5 Proposition 2
The conditions for the existence of a fully competent equilibrium are the following: First, every
competent member who receives a signal di¤erent than his bias must prefer to vote in accordance
with the state of the world:
U=A;full (vi = B; si = B)  U=A;full (vi = A; si = B)
and
U=B;full (vi = A; si = A)  U=B;full (vi = B; si = A)
Second, all incompetent members must prefer to abstain rather than to vote for either one of the
alternatives:
U=A;full (vi = ;; si = ;)  maxfU=A;full (vi = A; si = ;) ; U=A;full (vi = B; si = ;)g
and
U=B;full (vi = ;; si = ;)  maxfU=B;full (vi = A; si = ;) ; U=B;full (vi = B; si = ;)g;
where we assume that the beliefs of all agents, including the external evaluator, are consistent with
the equilibrium strategies.
After some algebra, it is possible to re-express the conditions on the behavior of competent
members more compactly as:
  + 1;full (C.14)
and
  + 2;full; (C.15)
whereas the conditions on the behavior of incompetent members can be rewritten as:
   1;full    2;full (C.16)
    3;full +  4;full (C.17)
and
   3;full    4;full (C.18)
    1;full +  2;full; (C.19)
where we dene:
1;full 
(er!=B;full (B)  er!=B;full (A))
!=Bfull (A)  !=Bfull (B)
 0
2;full 
(er!=A;full (A)  er!=A;full (B))
!=Afull (A)  !=Afull (B)
 0
 1;full 
(1  q) (!=Bfull (A)  !=Bfull (;))  q(!=Afull (A)  !=Afull (;))
q(!=Afull (A)  !=Afull (;)) + (1  q) (!=Bfull (A)  !=Bfull (;))
? 0
 2;full 
q(er!=A;full (A)  er!=A;full (;))
q(!=Afull (A)  !=Afull (;)) + (1  q) (!=Bfull (A)  !=Bfull (;))
 0
 3;full 
q(!=Afull (;)  !=Afull (B))  (1  q) (!=Bfull (;)  !=Bfull (B))
q(!=Afull (;)  !=Afull (B)) + (1  q) (!=Bfull (;)  !=Bfull (B))
? 0
 4;full 
(1  q)(er!=B;full (B)  er!=B;full (;))
q(!=Afull (;)  !=Afull (B)) + (1  q) (!=Bfull (;)  !=Bfull (B))
 0
Note also that, although we cannot determine the sign of the terms  1;full and  

3;full, it must be
the case that  1   1;full  1 and  1   3;full  1:
In equilibrium, all of the above conditions must hold simultaneously. However, observe that
if condition (C:16) is satised, then it must be that  1;full    2;full > 0, since  > 0, which,
in turn, implies that  1;full > 0: We must, then, have that   1;full +  2;full < 0, which means
that condition (C:19) is necessarily satised. Furthermore, since 0 <  1;full  1 and  2;full  0,
condition (C:14) also holds, given that  1;full   2;full < +1;full. Therefore, we conclude that
whenever (C:16) is satised, then (C:14) and (C:19) also hold. Similarly, observe that if condition
(C:18) is satised, then  3;full    4;full > 0, which, in turn, implies that  3;full > 0. We must
then have that   3;full +  4;full < 0, which means that condition (C:17) is necessarily satised.
Moreover, since 0 <  3;full  1 and  4;full  0, then condition (C:15) must also hold. Hence, we
conclude that whenever (C:18) is satised, then (C:15) and (C:17) also hold.
Intuitively, what we have shown is that, given the equilibrium beliefs, if incompetent members
from both types prefer to abstain rather than to vote in accordance with their biases, then no
incompetent member would ever have an incentive to vote against his bias and, likewise, no com-
petent member would ever prefer to vote against his bias rather than to vote in accordance with
the state of the world. Therefore, for a fully competent equilibrium to be sustained it is enough
that conditions (C:16) and (C:18) both hold. Observe that we can express these conditions more
compactly as:
  full (; ; ; n) ; (C.20)
where:
full (; ; ; n)  minf 1;full    2;full;  3;full    4;fullg (C.21)
and note that full (; ; ; n) < , since  

2;full; 

4;full  0 and  1 <  1;full < 1 and  1 <  3;full
< 1:
Finally, we have:

p
full (; ; ; n) < 
s
full (; ; ; n) ; (C.22)
since  p1;full =  
s
1;full and  
p
3;full =  
s
3;full, given that the expressions  

1;full and  

3;full are indepen-
dent of the degree of transparency, : Furthermore, note that  p2;full >  
s
2;full and  
p
4;full >  
s
4;full,
which follow, respectively, from the facts that:
er!=A;pfull (A)  er!=A;pfull (;) > er!=A;sfull (A)  er!=A;sfull (;)
and er!=B;pfull (B)  er!=B;pfull (;) > er!=B;sfull (B)  er!=B;sfull (;);
by Lemma 2. Intuitively, the career concern reward associated with a correct vote relatively to that
associated with an abstention is larger under public voting, so that incompetent members have less
incentive to abstain under transparency. 
C.6 Proposition 3
The conditions for the existence of a partially competent equilibrium are the following: First, every
competent member who receives a signal di¤erent than his bias must prefer to vote in accordance
with the state of the world:
U=A;part (vi = B; si = B)  U=A;part (vi = A; si = B)
and
U=B;part (vi = A; si = A)  U=B;part (vi = B; si = A)
Second, some incompetent members must prefer to vote for either one of the alternatives rather
than to abstain:
U;part (vi = ;; si = ;)  minfU;part (vi = A; si = ;) ; U;part (vi = B; si = ;)g;
for at least one type  2 fA;Bg, where we assume that the beliefs of all agents, including the
external evaluator, are consistent with the equilibrium strategies.
After some algebra, it is possible to re-express the conditions on the behavior of competent
members more compactly as:
  + 1;part (C.23)
and
  + 2;part; (C.24)
whereas the conditions on the behavior of incompetent members can be rewritten as:
   1;part    2;part (C.25)
and/or
    3;part +  4;part (C.26)
and/or
   3;part    4;part (C.27)
and/or
    1;part +  2;part; (C.28)
where we dene:
1;part 
(er!=B;part (B)  er!=B;part (A))
!=Bpart (A)  !=Bpart (B)
 0
2;part 
(er!=A;part (A)  er!=A;part (B))
!=Apart (A)  !=Apart (B)
 0
 1;part 
(1  q) (!=Bpart (A)  !=Bpart (;))  q(!=Apart (A)  !=Apart (;))
q(!=Apart (A)  !=Apart (;)) + (1  q) (!=Bpart (A)  !=Bpart (;))
? 0
 2;part 
q(er!=A;part (A)  er!=A;part (;))
q(!=Apart (A)  !=Apart (;)) + (1  q) (!=Bpart (A)  !=Bpart (;))
 0
 3;part 
q(!=Apart (;)  !=Apart (B))  (1  q) (!=Bpart (;)  !=Bpart (B))
q(!=Apart (;)  !=Apart (B)) + (1  q) (!=Bpart (;)  !=Bpart (B))
? 0
 4;part 
(1  q)(er!=B;part (B)  er!=B;part (;))
q(!=Apart (;)  !=Apart (B)) + (1  q) (!=Bpart (;)  !=Bpart (B))
 0
Note also that, although we cannot determine the sign of the terms  1;part and  

3;part, it must be
the case that  1   1;part  1 and  1   3;part  1:
In equilibrium, both conditions on competent agents must be satised, plus at least one of
the conditions on incompetent agents must hold. Thus, the following condition must always be
satised:
  c  minf+ 1;part; + 2;partg
Now, let:
nc  maxf  1;part +  2;part;  3;part +  4;partg
and
nc  minf 1;part    2;part;  3;part    4;partg;
where nc =  nc: Observe that if nc < 0, then either (C:25) or (C:27) or both are necessarily
satised, in which case the condition for the existence of a partially competent equilibrium is simply
given by:
  c
On the other hand, if nc > 0, then we must necessarily have nc < 0, so that that (C:26) and
(C:28) cannot be satised, in which case the following condition must hold:
nc    c
Thus, the condition for the existence of a partially competent equilibrium can be written as:

part
(; ; ; n)    part (; ; ; n) ; (C.29)
where:

part
(; ; ; n)  minf 1;part    2;part;  3;part    4;partg (C.30)
and
part (; ; ; n)  minf+ 1;part; + 2;partg (C.31)
Note that part (; ; ; n) < , since  

2;part; 

4;part  0 and  1 <  1;part < 1 and  1 <  3;part < 1:
Moreover, part (; ; ; n) > , since 

1;part;

2;part > 0.
Finally, observe that:
spart (; ; ; n) < 
p
part (; ; ; n) ; (C.32)
since p1;part > 
s
1;part and 
p
2;part > 
s
2;part, which follow, respectively, from the facts that:
er!=B;ppart (B)  er!=B;ppart (A) > er!=B;spart (B)  er!=B;spart (A)
and er!=A;ppart (A)  er!=A;ppart (B) > er!=A;spart (A)  er!=A;spart (B);
by Lemma 2. Furthermore, we also have that:
p
part
(; ; ; n) < s
part
(; ; ; n) ; (C.33)
since  p1;part =  
s
1;part,  
p
3;part =  
s
3;part,  
p
2;part >  
s
2;part and  
p
4;part >  
s
4;part. Note that these last
two inequalities follow from the facts that:
er!=A;ppart (A)  er!=A;ppart (;) > er!=A;spart (A)  er!=A;spart (;)
and er!=B;ppart (B)  er!=B;ppart (;) > er!=B;spart (B)  er!=B;spart (;);
by Lemma 2. 
C.7 Proposition 4
The conditions for the existence of a biased equilibrium are the following: First, some competent
members who receive a signal di¤erent than their bias must prefer to vote against the state of the
world:
U=A;bias (vi = B; si = B)  U=A;bias (vi = A; si = B) (C.34)
and/or
U=B;bias (vi = A; si = A)  U=B;bias (vi = B; si = A) (C.35)
Second, all incompetent members must prefer to vote rather than to abstain:
U;bias (vi = ;; si = ;)  minfU;bias (vi = A; si = ;) ; U;bias (vi = B; si = ;)g; (C.36)
where we assume that the beliefs of all agents, including the external evaluator, are consistent with
the equilibrium strategies.
From Lemma 3, it follows that if either (C:34) or (C:35) are satised, then (C:36) must neces-
sarily hold. Moreover, note that, after some algebra, the conditions on competent members can be
re-expressed more compactly as:
  + 1;bias (C.37)
and/or
  + 2;bias; (C.38)
where we dene:
1;bias 
(er!=B;bias (B)  er!=B;bias (A))
!=Bbias (A)  !=Bbias (B)
 0
2;bias 
(er!=A;bias (A)  er!=A;bias (B))
!=Abias (A)  !=Abias (B)
 0
Therefore, the condition for the existence of a biased equilibrium can be written as:
  
bias
(; ; ; n) ; (C.39)
where

bias
(; ; ; n)  minf+ 1;bias; + 2;biasg (C.40)
Note that 
bias
(; ; ; n) > , since 1;bias;

2;bias > 0. We also have that:
s
bias
(; ; ; n) < p
bias
(; ; ; n) ;
since p1;bias > 
s
1;bias and 
p
2;biast > 
s
2;bias, which follow, respectively, from the facts that:
er!=B;pbias (B)  er!=B;pbias (A) > er!=B;sbias (B)  er!=B;sbias (A)
and er!=A;pbias (A)  er!=A;pbias (B) > er!=A;sbias (A)  er!=A;sbias (B);
by Lemma 2. 
C.8 Proposition 5
We start by deriving the conditions for the existence of a fully competent equilibrium under sym-
metry. Assuming that all competent members vote correctly and all incompetent members abstain,
we have:
!=Afull (A)  !=Afull (;) = !=Bfull (;)  !=Bfull (B) =
1
2
(1  )n 1
!=Afull (;)  !=Afull (B) = !=Bfull (A)  !=Bfull (;) =
1
2
(1  )n 1 + 1
2
(n  1) (1  )n 2 
Moreover, note that in this case:
er!=A;pfull (A) = er!=B;pfull (B) = 1
er!=A;pfull (;) = er!=B;pfull (;) = 0
er!=A;sfull (A) = er!=B;sfull (B) = 1n 1 + E( Pj 6=i Ifvj=!g)
er!=A;sfull (;) = er!=B;pfull (;) = 1nE( Pj 6=i Ifvj=!g)
Therefore, from (C:20) and (C:21), it follows that:
full (; ; ; n) 
(n  1)
2 + (n  3) 
1 
1 + n 32 

(1  )n 2

1  n  1
n
If=sg

 (C.41)
Next, we proceed to derive the conditions for the existence of a partially competent equilib-
rium under symmetry. Assuming that all competent members vote correctly and all incompetent
members vote for their biases, we have:
!part(A)  !part(B) =

n  1
(n  1) =2

 +
1
2
(1  )
n 1
2

1
2
(1  )
n 1
2
!part(A)  !part(;) = !part(;)  !part(B) =
1
2

n  1
(n  1) =2

 +
1
2
(1  )
n 1
2

1
2
(1  )
n 1
2
;
for ! 2 fA;Bg, where the term + 12 (1  ) represents the proportion of committee members that
are expected to vote for the correct alternative in equilibrium. Note, also, that:
er!=B;ppart (B) = er!=A;ppart (A) =  + 12 (1  )
er!=A;ppart (B) = er!=B;ppart (A) = er!=A;ppart (;) = er!=B;ppart (;) = 0
er!=B;spart (B) = er!=A;spart (A) = 1n  + 12 (1  )

1 + E(
P
j 6=i Ifvj=!g)

er!=A;spart (B) = er!=B;spart (A) = er!=A;spart (;) = er!=B;spart (;) = 1n  + 12 (1  )E( Pj 6=i Ifvj=!g)
Therefore, from equations (C:30) and (C:31), it follows that:

part
(; ; ; n) < 0 (C.42)
and
part (; ; ; n) = +
2n 
n 1
(n 1)=2

(1 + )
n+1
2 (1  )n 12

1  n  1
n
If=sg

; (C.43)
where the rst expression follows from the fact that  1;part  2;part =  3;part  4;part < 0, since
 1;part =  

3;part = 0 and  

2;part; 

4;part > 0.
Finally, let us derive the conditions for the existence of a biased equilibrium. Assuming that all
members vote in accordance with their biases, we have:
!bias(A)  !bias(B) =

n  1
(n  1)=2

1
2
n 1
2

1
2
n 1
2
;
for ! 2 fA;Bg. Observe that, in this case, the proportion of members expected to vote for each of
the alternatives is exactly 12 . Note, also, that:
er!=A;pbias (A) = er!=B;pbias (B) = 
er!=A;pbias (B) = er!=B;pbias (A) = 0
er!=A;sbias (A) = er!=B;sbias (B) = n 1 + E( Pj 6=i Ifvj=!g)
er!=A;sbias (B) = er!=B;sbias (A) = n E( Pj 6=i Ifvj=!g)
Therefore, from equation (C:40), it follows that:

bias
(; ; ; n) = +
2n 1 
n 1
(n 1)=2
 1  n  1
n
If=sg

 (C.44)
Finally, note that:
0  (n  1)
2 + (n  3)  1;
since n  3 and  2 (0; 1); and
2n 
n 1
(n 1)=2

(1 + )
n+1
2 (1  )n 12
>
2n 1 
n 1
(n 1)=2
 ;
since 2 > (1 + )
n+1
2 (1  )n 12 :5 Therefore, comparing equations (C:41), (C:43) and (C:44), we
have:
full (; ; ; n) < 

bias
(; ; ; n) < part (; ; ; n)
Furthermore, form the inspection of these expressions, it is immediate to see that:

p
full (; ; ; n) < 
s
full (; ; ; n)

p
part (; ; ; n) > 
s
part (; ; ; n)
and
p
bias
(; ; ; n) > s
bias
(; ; ; n) 
C.9 Proposition 6
Note that if spart (; ; ; n) <  < 
p
part (; ; ; n), then a partially competent equilibrium can be
sustained under public but not under secret voting. Furthermore, for this range of parameters, a
biased equilibrium always exists under secret voting, but may or may not exist under public voting.
Therefore, the probability of a correct decision under public voting is at least as large as under
secret voting, i.e.:
p = min
nPn
i=(n+1)=2
 
n
i
  
 + 12 (1  )
i  1
2 (1  )
n i
; 12
o
 s = 12
Next, observe that if pfull (; ; ; n) <  < 
s
full (; ; ; n), then a fully competent equilibrium
can be sustained under secret but not under public voting. Note that for this range of parameters,
a partially competent equilibrium always exists under both secret and public voting. Thus, the
5Note that 2 > (1 + )
n+1
2 (1  )n 12 $ 2 > (1 + ) (1 + )n 12 (1  )n 12 $ 2 2n 1 > (1 + ) 2n 1  1  2.
Observe that the last inequality always holds for any n  3 and  2 (0; 1), since 2 2n 1 > (1 + ) 2n 1 and 1  2 < 1:
probability of a correct decision under secret voting is at least as large as under public voting, i.e.:
smin
n
1  12 (1  )n ;
Pn
i=(n+1)=2
 
n
i
  
 + 12 (1  )
i  1
2 (1  )
n io
 p =Pni=(n+1)=2  ni   + 12 (1  )i  12 (1  )n i 
C.10 Proposition 7
Note, rst, that:

p
part   spart =

n  1
n

2n 
n 1
(n 1)=2

(1 + )
n+1
2 (1  )n 12

Thus, it follows that:
@fppart spartg
@ =
2n(n 1)
n( n 1(n 1)=2)(1+)
n+1
2 (1 )n 12
> 0
Furthermore, we have:
@fppart spartg
@ =
2n(n 1)
n( n 1(n 1)=2)
(1+)
n+1
2 (1 )n 12
(1+)
n+1
2 (1 )n 12
2 h1   n+12 11+   n 12 11 i > 0 ;
since 1  

n+1
2
1
1+   n 12 11 

> 0:6
Next, note that:
sfull   pfull =

n  1
n

1 
1 + n 32 

(1  )n 2
Thus, it follows that:
@fsfull 
p
fullg
@ =
 
n 1
n

1
(1+n 32 )(1 )n 2
> 0
Moreover, we have:
@fsfull 
p
fullg
@ =   n 1n((1+n 32 )(1 )n 2)2

n 3
2 (1  ) 
 
1 + n 32 

(n  2) (1  )n 3 > 0,
since n 32 (1  ) 
 
1 + n 32 

(n  2) =  n+12   n 32    (n  2) n 32  < 0: 
C.11 Proposition 8
Preliminaries. Under the assumption that career concerns are proportional to r!;i  Pr( i =
cj!; I), the expected career concern reward of a committee member under public and secret voting
6Note that this inequality can be re-written as (1 + ) (1  ) >  (1  n), so that 2 (n  1) + (1  ) > 0,
which always holds.
are given, respectively, by:
er!;p (vi) =Pm2fA;;;Bg Pr(t = cjv = m;!):Ifvi=mg (C.45)
and er!;s (vi) = 1nPm2fA;;;Bg Pr(t = cjv = m;!):(Ifvi=mg + E(Pj 6=i Ifvj=mg)); (C.46)
where, as before, the conditional probabilities Pr(t =cjv = m;!), for m 2 fA; ;; Bg, are computed
based on the external evaluators beliefs.
Moreover, note that for any k; l 2 fA; ;; Bg, with k 6= l, we have that:
er!;p (k)  er!;p (l) = Pr(t = cjv = k; !)  Pr(t = cjv = l; !)
and er!;s (k)  er!;s (l) = 1
n
(Pr(t = cjv = k; !)  Pr(t = cjv = l; !))
Therefore, conditional on the evaluators beliefs, the di¤erence er!; (k)  er!; (l) must always have
the same sign under both voting rules,  2 fp,sg : Finally, note that the absolute di¤erence between
the career concern rewards associated with strategies k and l are always larger under public voting,
i.e.:
jer!;p (k)  er!;p (l) j  jer!;s (k)  er!;s (l) j (C.47)
This is the sense in which the dilution e¤ectis still active in this version of the model.
Proof. Consider the behavior of a competent member whose bias is equal to the state of the world,
i = !. The expected payo¤ of such an agent is given by:
Ui=A;(vi; si = A) = er!=A;(vi) + !=A(vi) (+ ) (C.48)
and
Ui=B;(vi; si = B) = er!=B;(vi) +  1  !=B(vi) (+ ) ; (C.49)
depending on whether he is biased towards A or B, respectively.
Observe that necessary conditions for at least one type of competent member to prefer to vote
against the state of the world when his bias is equal to the state are given by:
Ui=A;(vi = B; si = A)  Ui=A;(vi = A; si = A)
or
Ui=B;(vi = A; si = B)  Ui=B;(vi = B; si = B)
After some manipulations, we can rewrite the above conditions as:
+   (er!=A;(B)  er!=A;(A))
!=A(A)  !=A(B) (C.50)
or
+   (er!=B;(A)  er!=B;(B))
!=B(A)  !=B(B) (C.51)
Note that since the parameters  and  are both assumed to be strictly positive, we must have that
either er!=A;(B) > er!=A;(A) or er!=B;(A) > er!=B;(B) for at least one of the above conditions
to hold.
Similarly, necessary conditions for at least one type of competent member to prefer to abstain
when his bias is equal to the state are:
Ui=A;(vi = ;; si = A)  Ui=A;(vi = A; si = A)
or
Ui=B;(vi = ;; si = B)  Ui=B;(vi = B; si = B)
We can rewrite the above conditions as:
+   (er!=A;(;)  er!=A;(A))
!=A(A)  !=A(;) (C.52)
or
+   
 er!=B;(;)  er!=B;(B)
!=B(;)  !=B(B) (C.53)
Again, since the parameters  and  are both strictly positive, we must have that either er!=A;(;) >er!=A;(A) or er!=B;(;) > er!=B;(B) for at least one of the above conditions to hold. 
C.12 Proposition 9
Note that from equations (C:50) and (C:51) in the proof of Proposition 8, a necessary condition
for a competent member with bias equal to the state of the world to vote against the state of the
world is:
+   max

(er!=A;(B)  er!=A;(A))
!=A(A)  !=A(B) ;
(er!=B;(A)  er!=B;(B))
!=B(A)  !=B(B)

; (C.54)
whereas from equations (C:52) and (C:53), a necessary condition for agents of this type to abstain
is given by:
+   max
(
(er!=A;(;)  er!=A;(A))
!=A(A)  !=A(;) ;

 er!=B;(;)  er!=B;(B)
!=B(;)  !=B(B)
)
 (C.55)
C.13 Proposition 10
An equilibrium where a competent member biased against the state of the world abstains can be
sustained only if:
Ui=A;(vi = ;; si = B)  maxfUi=A;(vi = B; si = B); Ui=A;(vi = A; si = B)g
or
Ui=B;(vi = ;; si = A)  maxfUi=B;(vi = A; si = A); Ui=B;(vi = B; si = A)g
After some algebra, we can rewrite the above conditions as:
 
 er!=B;(;)  er!=B;(B)
!=B(;)  !=B(B)      
(er!=B;(;)  er!=B;(A))
!=B(A)  !=B(;) (C.56)
or
 
 er!=A;(;)  er!=A;(A)
!=A(A)  !=A(;)      

 er!=A;(;)  er!=A;(B)
!=A(;)  !=A(B) (A.57)
Thus, the di¤erence in absolute terms between the parameters  and  cannot be too large. In
fact, note that if  is much larger than , then the agent would have an incentive to vote for the
correct alternative, whereas if  is much larger than , then the agent would have an incentive to
vote in accordance with his bias. This proves part (i) of the proposition.
Next, suppose, for concreteness, that the state of the world is A and assume that a competent
member biased towards B abstains in equilibrium, so that we must have:
Ui=B;(vi = ;; si = A)  Ui=B;(vi = B; si = A) (C.58)
Note that the above expression can be written as:
er!=A;(;) + !=A(;)+  1  !=A(;)   er!=A;(B) + !=A(B)+  1  !=A(B) 
and re-arranging we get:
(er!=A;(;)  er!=A;(B)) +  !=A(;)  !=A(B)   !=A(;)  !=A(B) 
Observe that since the righ-hand side is positive, it must be the case that:
(er!=A;(;)  er!=A;(B)) +  !=A(;)  !=A(B)     !=A(;)  !=A(B) 
Finally, the above inequality can be re-expressed as:
er!=A;(;) + !=A(;) (+ )  er!=A;(B) + !=A(B) (+ ) ;
so that:
Ui=A;(vi = ;; si = A) > Ui=A;(vi = B; si = A) (C.59)
Therefore, a competent member biased towards A would never have the incentive to vote against
the state of the world in this case. A similar argument applies to when the state of the world is B.
This proves part (ii) of the proposition.
Next, suppose that beliefs are monotone, i.e. er!;(vi = !)  er!;(vi 6= !) for ! 2 fA;Bg. Note
that, in this case, conditions (C:56) and (A:57) can rewritten as:
+

 er!=B;(B)  er!=B;(;)
!=B(;)  !=B(B)| {z }
0
   + (er!=B;(;)  er!=B;(A))
!=B(A)  !=B(;) (C.60)
or
+

 er!=A;(A)  er!=A;(;)
!=A(A)  !=A(;)| {z }
0
   + 
 er!=A;(;)  er!=A;(B)
!=A(;)  !=A(B) ; (C.61)
Therefore, the equilibrium can only exist if either (er!=B;(;) er!=B;(A))
!=B(A) !=B(;)  0 or
(er!=A;(;) er!=A;(B))
!=A(;) !=A(B) 
0, that is a necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition for the equilibrium to exist is:
er!=B;(;)  er!=B;(A)
or er!=A;(;)  er!=A;(B)
Assuming that the equilibrium exists, it must be the case (necessary condition) that:

abst
(; ; ; n)    abst(; ; ; n); (C.62)
where the thresholds 
abst
and abst can be dened as:

abst
(; ; ; n)  min
(
+

 er!=B;(B)  er!=B;(;)
!=B(;)  !=B(B) ; +

 er!=A;(A)  er!=A;(;)
!=A(A)  !=A(;)
)
and
abst(; ; ; n)  max
(
+
(er!=B;(;)  er!=B;(A))
!=B(A)  !=B(;) ; +

 er!=A;(;)  er!=A;(B)
!=A(;)  !=A(B)
)
;
where 
abst
(; ; ; n) and abst(; ; ; n) are both larger than : Furthermore, if the equilibrium
exists, there must be at least one state of the world ! 2 fA;Bg such that:
er!;abst(vi = ;)  er!;abst(vi = !);
where  ! denotes a vote against the state of the world, for otherwise conditions (C:60) and (C:61)
would certainly not hold. Thus, from the dilution e¤ect(see inequality (C:47) in Proposition 8),
it follows that: er!;pabst(vi = !)  er!;pabst(vi = ;)  er!;sabst(vi = !)  er!;sabst(vi = ;)
and er!;pabst(vi = ;)  er!;pabst(vi = !)  er!;sabst(vi = ;)  er!;sabst(vi = !)
Therefore, we have:
s
abst
(; ; ; n)  p
abst
(; ; ; n)
and
sabst(; ; ; n)  pabst(; ; ; n);
which proves part (iii) of the proposition: 
Appendix D. Model for Lab Experiment
Consider a committee of three members, n = 3, with uniform prior, q = 12 , and symmetric distrib-
ution of both bias, p = 12 , and competence types,  =
1
2 . Assume that the career concern reward
associated with a correct vote is exogenous and given by R for  2 fp,sg:
D.1 Fully Competent Equilibrium
Suppose that all committee members act in accordance with a fully competent equilibrium and
consider the behavior of a competent member biased against the state of the world. Note that for
agents of this type the expected utility of voting in accordance with the state of the world is:
U;full (vi = si; si 6= ) = +R;
while the expected utility of voting in accordance with his or her bias is:
U;full (vi = ; si 6= ) =
1
2
+
1
2

Therefore, the condition for a competent member to always prefer to vote correctly in equilibrium
is:
+R  1
2
+
1
2
 )   + 2R (D.1)
Now, consider the behavior of an incompetent member. Observe that for agents of this type
the expected utility of abstaining is:
U;full (vi = ;; si = ;) =
7
8
+
1
2
;
while the expected utility of voting in accordance with his or her bias is:
U;full (vi = ; si = ;) =
3
4
+
3
4
 +
1
2
R
Thus, the condition for an incompetent member to always prefer to abstain in equilibrium is:
7
8
+
1
2
  3
4
+
3
4
 +
1
2
R )   1
2
  2R (D.2)
Finally, note that the condition on incompetent members (D:2) is always harder to satisfy than
condition on competent members (D:1), so that a fully competent equilibrium can be sustained if,
and only if:
  1
2
  2R (D.3)
D.2 Partially Competent Equilibrium
Next, suppose that all committee members act in accordance with a partially competent equilibrium
and consider the behavior of a competent member biased against the state of the world. Note that
for agents of this type the expected utility of voting in accordance with the state of the world is:
U;part (vi = si; si 6= ) =
15
16
+
1
16
 +R;
while the expected utility of voting in accordance with his or her bias is:
U;part (vi = ; si 6= ) =
9
16
+
7
16

Therefore, the condition for a competent member to always prefer to vote correctly in equilibrium
is:
15
16
+
1
16
 +R  9
16
+
7
16
 )   + 8
3
R (D.4)
Now, consider the behavior of an incompetent member. Observe that for agents of this type
the expected utility of abstaining is:
U;part (vi = ;; si = ;) =
3
4
+
1
2
;
while the expected utility of voting in accordance with his or her bias is:
U;part (vi = ; si = ;) =
3
4
+
11
16
 +
1
2
R
Thus, the condition for an incompetent member to prefer to vote in accordance with his bias rather
than to abstain is given by:
3
4
+
11
16
 +
1
2
R  3
4
+
1
2
 ) 3
16
 +
1
2
R  0 (D.5)
Note that this condition is always satised, so that we can guarantee that incompetent members
do not have any incentive to deviate from the equilibrium.
Therefore, it follows that a partially competent equilibrium can be sustained if, and only if:
  + 8
3
R (D.6)
D.3 Biased Equilibrium
Finally, suppose that all committee members act in accordance with a biased equilibrium and
consider the behavior of a competent member biased against the state of the world. Note that for
agents of this type the expected utility of voting in accordance with the state of the world is:
U;bias (vi = si; si 6= ) =
3
4
+
1
4
 +R;
while the expected utility of voting in accordance with his or her bias is:
U;bias (vi = ; si 6= ) =
1
4
+
3
4

Therefore, the condition for a competent member to always prefer to vote for his or her bias in
equilibrium is:
3
4
+
1
4
 +R  1
4
+
3
4
 )   + 2R (D.7)
Next, consider the behavior of an incompetent member. Observe that for agents of this type
the expected utility of abstaining is:
U;bias (vi = ;; si = ;) =
1
2
+
1
2
;
while the expected utility of voting in accordance with his bias is:
U;bias (vi = ; si = ;) =
1
2
+
3
4
 +
1
2
R
Thus, the condition for an incompetent member to prefer to vote in accordance with his bias rather
than to abstain is given by:
1
2
+
3
4
 +
1
2
R  1
2
+
1
2
 ) 1
4
 +
1
2
R  0 (D.8)
Note that this condition is always satised, so that, consistently with Lemma 3, incompetent
members do not have any incentive to deviate from the equilibrium in this case.
Therefore, it follows that a biased equilibrium can be sustained if, and only if:
  + 2R  (D.9)
Appendix E. Experiment Instructions
This section presents the English version of the experiment instructions for treatments Low/Secret
and Low/Public.7 See Figures E.1 and E.2 for a depiction of the two main screens of the experiment.
Instructions
Thank you for your participation! The goal of this study is to investigates how people make
decisions in group. You will be paid 2 euros for your presence. Your total earnings will depend
partly on your decisions, partly on the decisions of other participants, and partly on chance. Your
gains will be calculated in points and will be converted in euros at the rate of 1 euro per 80 points.
You will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment.
During the experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with anyone. Please turn o¤ your
cell phone. If you have any question, please raise your hand.
This study is divided in 2 parts. We will begin by reading the instructions for the rst part.
Please, pay careful attention. After the instructions are read, there will be a short comprehension
quiz.
First Part
This part consists of 32 rounds. The rst two rounds are practice rounds and will not be paid.
All other rounds are paid.
Groups. We begin every round by randomly dividing you into groups of three people. Every group
receives one color: Blue or Yellow. In each round, your groups color may be Blue or Yellow with
equal probability. The color of your group may be di¤erent from the colors of other groups and
may change from one round to another. The computer will randomly choose your groups color in
every round. Some people observe their groups color, while others do not.
Votes. In each round, your group will choose one color by voting. Each member of the group may
vote for Blue, vote for Yellow or abstain. Whichever color receives more votes is the groups choice.
Ties are broken randomly by the computer. Examples:
i: If the number of votes for Blue is 2, the number of votes for Yellow is 1 and the number of
abstentions is 0, then Blue is the groups choice;
ii: If the number of votes for Blue is 0, the number of votes for Yellow is 2 and the number of
abstentions is 1, then Yellow is the groups choice;
7The full set of instructions in Italian is available upon request.
iii: If the number of votes for Blue is 1, the number of votes for Yellow is 1 and the number of
abstentions is 1, then we have a tie and the groups choice will be Blue or Yellow with equal
probability;
iv: If all members of the group abstain, then we have a tie and the groups choice will be Blue
or Yellow with equal probability.
Messages. Before voting, each of you will receive a message that may reveal the color of your
group. There are three types of message.
1: The message says: The color of your group is Blue. In this case, you know for sure that
your groups color is Blue.
2: The message says: The color of your group is Yellow. In this case, you know for sure that
your groups color is Yellow.
3: The message says: The color of your group is Blue or Yellow with equal probability. In
this case, the message does not provide any additional information with respect to what was
already known.
Messages 1 and 2 are informative messages, while the third one is an uninformative message. In
every round, half of the people in this room will receive an uninformative message, while the other
half will receive an informative message and, therefore, will know exactly what is the color of their
groups. For every group, there are four possible cases.
1: All members of the group know the groups color;
2: Two members of the group know the groups color while one member does not know;
3: One member of the group knows the groups color while two members do not know;
4: No member of the group knows the groups color.
Why does your vote matter? Your payo¤ in a given round depends on the choice made by
your group, which is the color that receives the largest number of votes. If your group chooses
the alternative that matches your groups color, then all members of the group receive 10 points;
otherwise, everyone receives zero points.
Roles. Your payo¤ also involves an additional component that depends on your role. In every
round, the computer will randomly assign a role to each of you, which can be either Blue or Yellow.
In every round, half of the people in this room will receive the Blue role and the other half will
receive the Yellow role. Your role in a given round does not depend on the role of other members
of your group nor on your role in previous rounds. For a given group, the number of members with
the Blue role can be 3, 2, 1 or none. Your role is not known by anyone except you. If your groups
choice is equal to your role, then you receive 1 extra point; otherwise, you receive no extra point.
Examples. Suppose that your role is Blue. The following table summarizes all possible payo¤s in
this case:
Groups
Color
Groups
Choice
Groups Choice
= Groups Color
Groups Choice
= Role
Total
Payo¤
i Blue Blue 10 + 1 11
ii Yellow Yellow 10 + 0 10
iii Yellow Blue 0 + 1 1
iv Blue Yellow 0 + 0 0
The rst line corresponds to the case where your groups color is Blue and your groups choice
is Blue. In this case, your total payo¤ is 11 points: 10 points because your groups choice is equal
to your groups color plus 1 extra point because your groups choice is equal to your role. In the
second line, we have, instead, the case where your groups color is Yellow and your groups choice
is Yellow. In this case, your total payo¤ is 10 points because your groups choice is equal to your
groups color but not equal to your role. Next, in the third line, your groups color is Yellow and
your groups choice is Blue. In this case, your total payo¤ is 1 point because your groups choice
is equal to your role, but not equal to your groups color. Finally, in the fourth line, your payo¤ is
zero, because your groups choice is neither equal to your groups color nor to your role.
Similarly, suppose that your role is Yellow. The following table summarizes all possible payo¤s
in this case:
Groups
Color
Groups
Choice
Groups Choice
= Groups Color
Groups Choice
= Role
Total
Payo¤
i Yellow Yellow 10 + 1 11
ii Blue Blue 10 + 0 10
iii Blue Yellow 0 + 1 1
iv Yellow Blue 0 + 0 0
The rst line corresponds to the case where your groups color is Yellow and your groups choice
is Yellow. In this case, your total payo¤ is 11 points: 10 points because your groups choice is equal
to your groups color plus 1 extra point because your groups choice is equal to your role. In the
second line, we have, instead, the case where your groups color is Blue and your groups choice
is Blue. In this case, your total payo¤ is 10 points because your groups choice is equal to your
groups color but not equal to your role. Next, in the third line, your groups color is Blue and
your groups choice is Yellow. In this case, your total payo¤ is 1 point because your groups choice
is equal to your role, but not equal to your groups color. Finally, in the fourth line, your payo¤ is
zero, because your groups choice is neither equal to your groups color nor to your role.
Summary. To conclude, please remember the following information.
 At the beginning of each round, you will see a screen with information about your message
and your role.
 In every round, the number of members of your group who know the groups color can be 3,
2, 1 or none.
 In every round, the number of members of your group with the Blue role can be 3, 2, 1 or
none.
 You can vote for Blue, vote for Yellow or abstain. Remember that the groups choice is taken
by majority and that ties are broken randomly by the computer.
 After every round, you will be able to see what were your groups color and choice in that
round. You will also receive information about your payo¤ and how many members of your
group voted for Blue, voted Yellow and abstained.
 Your payo¤ in every round is determined by the sum of two components:
If your groups choice is equal to your groups color, then all members
of the group earn 10 points. Otherwise, everyone gets zero points.
+
If your groups choice is equal to your role, then you
earn 1 extra point. Otherwise, you get zero extra points.
 Remember that the decision of each group is independent of the decisions of other groups and
that new groups are formed randomly in every round.
Second Part
The second part of the experiment is almost exactly the same as the rst part, with a single
di¤erence. In the rst part, your payo¤ depended on your groups choice, your groups color and
your role. In this part of the experiment, your payo¤ will depend on your groups choice, your
groups color, your role and on how you vote. In particular, if you vote for your groups color, you
will now earn 9 extra points. Otherwise, if you vote for a color that is di¤erent than your groups
color or if you abstain, you will earn zero extra points. For example, if you vote for Yellow and your
groups color is Yellow, then you receive 9 extra points independently of what your group chooses.
Remember that you still earn 10 points if your groups choice is equal to your groups color and 1
extra point if your groups choice is equal to your role.
Examples. Suppose that your role is Blue and that you voted for Blue. The following table
summarizes all possible payo¤s in this case:
Groups
Color
Groups
Choice
Groups
Choice
=
Groups
Color
Groups
Choice
=
Role
Vote
=
Groups
Color
Total
Payo¤
i Blue Blue 10 + 1 + 9 20
ii Yellow Yellow 10 + 0 + 0 10
iii Yellow Blue 0 + 1 + 0 1
iv Blue Yellow 0 + 0 + 9 9
The rst line corresponds to the case where your groups color is Blue and your groups choice
is Blue. In this case, your total payo¤ is 20 points. You earn 10 points because your groups choice
is equal to your groups color plus 1 extra point because your groups choice is equal to your role.
These two components of your payo¤ are exactly the same as in the rst part of the experiment,
but now you also earn 9 extra points because you voted for your groups color. In the second line,
we have, instead, the case where your groups color is Yellow and your groups choice is Yellow. In
this case, your total payo¤ is 10 points because your groups choice is equal to your groups color,
but not equal to your role, and you did not vote for your groups color. Next, in the third line, your
groups color is Yellow and your groups choice is Blue. In this case, your total payo¤ is 1 point
because your groups choice is equal to your role, but not equal to your groups color, and you did
not vote for your groups color. Finally, in the fourth line, your payo¤ is 9, because you voted for
your groups color, but your groups choice is neither equal to your groups color nor to your role.
Similarly, suppose that your role is Blue and that you voted for Yellow. The following table
summarizes all possible payo¤s in this case:
Groups
Color
Groups
Choice
Groups
Choice
=
Groups
Color
Groups
Choice
=
Role
Vote
=
Groups
Color
Total
Payo¤
i Blue Blue 10 + 1 + 0 11
ii Yellow Yellow 10 + 0 + 9 19
iii Yellow Blue 0 + 1 + 9 10
iv Blue Yellow 0 + 0 + 0 0
The rst line corresponds to the case where your groups color is Blue and your groups choice
is Blue. In this case, your total payo¤ is 11 points, because your groups choice is equal to your
groups color and to your role, but you did not vote for your groups color. In the second line, we
have, instead, the case where your groups color is Yellow and your groups choice is Yellow. In
this case, your total payo¤ is 19 points; 10 + 0 points because your groups choice is equal to your
groups color, but not equal to your role, plus 9 extra points because you voted for your groups
color. Next, in the third line, your groups color is Yellow and your groups choice is Blue. In this
case, your total payo¤ is 10 point because your groups choice is equal to your role, but not equal
to your groups color, and you voted for your groups color. Finally, in the fourth line, your payo¤
is zero, because you did not vote for your groups color and your groups choice is neither equal to
your groups color nor to your role.
Finally, suppose that your role is Blue and that you abstained. The following table summarizes
all possible payo¤s in this case:
Groups
Color
Groups
Choice
Groups
Choice
=
Groups
Color
Groups
Choice
=
Role
Vote
=
Groups
Color
Total
Payo¤
i Blue Blue 10 + 1 + 0 11
ii Yellow Yellow 10 + 0 + 0 10
iii Yellow Blue 0 + 1 + 0 1
iv Blue Yellow 0 + 0 + 0 0
The rst line corresponds to the case where your groups color is Blue and your groups choice
is Blue. In this case, your total payo¤ is 11 points, because your groups choice is equal to your
groups color and to your role, but you did not vote for your groups color. In the second line, we
have, instead, the case where your groups color is Yellow and your groups choice is Yellow. In this
case, your total payo¤ is 10 points, because your groups choice is equal to your groups color, but
not equal to your role, and you did not vote for your groups color. Next, in the third line, your
groups color is Yellow and your groups choice is Blue. In this case, your total payo¤ is 1 point
because your groups choice is equal to your role, but not equal to your groups color, and you did
not vote for your groups color. Finally, in the fourth line, your payo¤ is zero, because you did not
vote for your groups color and your groups choice is neither equal to your groups color nor to
your role.
In a similar way, you can calculate your payo¤s in case your role is Yellow.
Summary. To conclude, please remember the following information.
 At the beginning of each round, you will see a screen with information about your message
and your role.
 In every round, the number of members of your group who know the groups color can be 3,
2, 1 or none.
 In every round, the number of members of your group with the Blue role can be 3, 2, 1 or
none.
 You can vote for Blue, vote for Yellow or abstain. Remember that the groups choice is taken
by majority and that ties are broken randomly by the computer.
 After every round, you will be able to see what were your groups color and choice in that
round. You will also receive information about your payo¤ and how many members of your
group voted for Blue, voted Yellow and abstained.
 Your payo¤ in every round is determined by the sum of three components:
If your groups choice is equal to your groups color, then all members
of the group earn 10 points. Otherwise, everyone gets zero points.
+
If your groups choice is equal to your role, then you
earn 1 extra point. Otherwise, you get zero extra points.
+
If your vote is equal to your groups color, then you
earn 9 extra points. Otherwise, you get zero extra points.
 Remember that the decision of each group is independent of the decisions of other groups and
that new groups are formed randomly in every round.
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